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When a celebration following a college sporting event turns into a riot, the 
consequences may be devastating to a school, a community, and the police department. 
This trend is increasing on campuses across the country, and the perceived randomness of 
violence has police departments and communities alarmed. Based on several 
assumptions, current police training and policy focuses on crowd movement and riot 
suppression, which minimizes the ability to influence a crowd to the point of preventing a 
riot. One assumption is that large crowds share group similarities. Police also use 
inaccurate behavioral markers to identify the changing mood of a crowd and base their 
response on these markers. This thesis identifies the differences among disturbances and 
focuses specifically on riots that occur following college sporting events in the United 
States, using supporting data from case studies of college sporting events between 1997 
and 2015. Using the normative and social identity theories as models, this thesis shows 
that sports riots follow a specific pattern of social behaviors and shows how early 
intervention may influence the behavior of the crowd. Finally, it concludes with 
recommendations for police when managing the crowd before, during, and following a 
college sporting event.  
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This research questions whether current knowledge of behavioral patterns can 
help police to develop more effective strategies during riots after college sporting events. 
The short answer is “yes,” and the longer answer contributes specific insight into how 
that can be done effectively. The study examines social behaviors in five cases and uses 
data from after action reports and boards of inquiry, as well as newspaper articles and 
other written sources, to identify fan behavioral patterns before, during, and immediately 
following games. While similarities were observed, they lack the consistency necessary 
to conclude why some college campuses erupt in a riot following a sporting event while 
others do not. This led to an in-depth examination of crowd behavior. In all cases that 
ended in a conflict, the crowds, consisting of both student and non-student fans, 
energized as the game continued and ultimately converged in the middle of a nearby 
street, eventually turning against the police trying to clear the streets.  
Social norming and social identity theory are used as models to explain crowd 
behavior. Social norms are standardized behaviors within a group,1 and these behaviors 
develop over a person’s life by social construction that occurs through specific social 
interaction.2 Over time, what a person sees as acceptable behavior is developed and 
changed by social norms. Social identity theory (SIT), explains how individuals develop 
group cohesion in different circumstances.3 SIT shows that members of the group 
immediately begin inflating the value of their group (in-group) and diminishing the value 
of opposing groups (out-groups), thus creating out-group discrimination.4 Utilizing these 
methodological approaches, the research shows how the various stages occur and how 
police can use that information to avoid conflict while maintaining a safe environment.  
                                                 
1 Elton T. Reeves, The Dynamics of Group Behavior (New York: American Management Association, 
1970), 110.  
2 Peter L. Berger, and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (New York: Anchor 
Books, 1966), 132–133.  
3 Henri Tajfel, ed., Social Identity and Intergroup Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1982), 15.  
4 Ibid., 34.  
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Importantly, the study shows the conditions are observable by officers in the field, 
and this may allow them to adjust their tactics to more effectively provide public safety. 
First, members of the crowd must centralize in an area that allows them to develop their 
membership. Centralizing is both a physical and psychological process in which the 
crowd members meet in an area specifically to cheer for their team. Secondly, game 
importance and game intensity increase the potential for centralization and increase the 
energy within the crowd leading up to and throughout the game. Game intensity is a 
condition that occurs during the game itself. Close games or games in which victory is 
largely undetermined until the very end add to the energy of the crowd. Important games 
that lack intensity or intense games that do not carry any importance will be less likely to 
create the necessary energy to build crowd cohesion.  
The combination of the social norming, game conditions, and social identity 
creates a predictable crowd response, and this allows for police to properly prepare. 
Understanding this allows for a number of recommendations for police managers to 
follow when planning for these events. Some of these steps include establishing the norm 
for the crowd members to follow before, during, and following the game itself. By 
creating the norm, police and university administrators reduce the chance that the norm 
becomes established though other communities’ mistakes or through social media. 
During the games, police must fight through traditional crowd control training that 
assumes large groups of people may be dangerous and maintain constant contact with the 
crowd members, even when they centralize in the streets. Constant contact (versus 
pulling away to return with larger numbers) will reduce the potential for the social 
identity of the crowd to perceive the police as a separate group and a threat.  
The data cited in these case studies support the notion that sports-related riots may 
not be spontaneous, mob-like crowds as previously noted, but in fact, may be predictable 
and potentially preventable. 
 xix 
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As the clock ticks down to zero, the nervous energy of the crowd 
synchronistically builds to the point of delirium. It has taken a full year to 
get to this moment, and the basketball team has the full support of the 
entire city. The media coverage began months ago, building the hype even 
more with comparative stories about previous championship runs. On 
championship night, the bars in the student districts swarm with patrons, 
all wearing similar-colored shirts and glued to the big-screen televisions. 
To get the best view of the game, patrons, covering a spectrum of ages 
from 18-year-old students to 50-year-old native fans, arrive early to stake 
their claim to a seat in uniformed eager anticipation of another national 
championship. The chants of their team escalate and increase in intensity 
with every tick on the game clock.  
In the background, police officers stand nervously watching. 
Preparations for this night began months ago with crowd-suppression 
tactical training, formation drills, and operation planning. Also fans, 
police officers are torn between their teams winning and losing 
and conflicted about what potentially awaits at the end of the game. 
Win or lose, the moment the game concludes, the large group pours 
into the streets, joining other large groups from nearby bars to chant, 
celebrate, or commiserate. Then, without warning, the previously 
friendly crowd immediately and unexpectedly turns into a mob.  
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A. PURPOSE OF STUDY  
This scenario plays out at collegiate and professional sports programs across the 
nation throughout the year. Law enforcement professionals have studied the anatomy of a 
sports riot for decades, focusing mainly at its operational components, and academics 
have studied the sociology and psychology behind these incidents. These studies have 
streamlined planning, equipment needs, and tactical approaches to quell a riot more 
effectively; however, in spite of these efficacies, these events not only continue to occur 
but seem to be increasing in frequency.1 Few conclusions have been drawn that give law 
enforcement any insight for reducing or mitigating the violence associated with these 
types of events. This study highlights strategies and tactics that police currently use to 
managing large crowds and argues that current strategies miss an important step in 
preventing crowds from becoming violent. Several recent sports-related civil disturbances 
are examined to isolate social traits specific to sports riots, including student 
demographics, geographical areas of riots, grouping behavior, and police tactics. This 
thesis discerns whether recent studies about riots give enough explanation to influence 
police strategies for managing incidences or whether currently strategies are exacerbating 
the violence. The conclusion identifies predictive precursors to crowd behavior and offers 
recommendations to police management to prevent sports riots rather than simply 
responding to them.     
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
Violence surrounding a sporting event is not a new phenomenon. European soccer 
fans, called hooligans, have clashed with police and captured sports headlines throughout 
the 1990s.2 Described as mid-20-year-old men with “deeply rooted and long standing 
features of the communities of specific sections of the working class,” hooligans tend to 
be rowdy and potentially violent toward opposing fans and the police.3 The United States 
                                                 
1 John D. McCarthy, Andrew Martin, and Clark McPhail, “Accounting for Police Behavior at 
Disorderly Gatherings in Campus Communities, 1985–2002,” in Conference Papers: American 
Sociological Association, 1–41 (Washington, DC: American Sociological Association, 2005).  
2 Steve Frosdick, and Peter Marsh, Football Hooliganism (London: Routledge, 2013).  
3 Eric Dunning, Patrick Murphy, and John Williams, “Spectator Violence at Football Matches: 
Towards a Sociological Explanation,” The British Journal of Sociology 37, no. 2 (1986): 221–244.  
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has also seen its share of violent fan conduct after professional and collegiate sports. 
Over the past two decades, college towns across the nation have witnessed an increase in 
these violent clashes, leading to inquiries as to whether police tactics could be causing or 
escalating the conflicts.4  
Police training today focuses on limiting injuries and damaging property by 
quickly quelling these types of disturbances. Historically, the development of police 
strategy is based upon several assumptions about crowd development and often ignores 
crowd differences. This thesis explores these assumptions by examining two main topics: 
(1) the difference types of riots, the crowd dynamics of each, and other factors that may 
aggravate or mitigate violence; and (2) different police strategies used to influence these 
crowds. Although the examples for this thesis refer to different the types of riots, the 
ultimate focus is on college sporting events. The literature review gives a progression of 
crowd collectivism using Henri Tajfel and John Turner’s social identity theory5 to frame 
why students quickly unite and why this fragile relationship sometimes leads to violence. 
It also examines five events at the University of Arizona through official police 
documents (boards of inquiry, case reports, and after action reports) as well as various 
departments across the country to identify common strategies for managing crowds. The 
conclusion creates a clear separation of the different crowds associated with different 
types riot, identifies common conditions seen prior to and during a college sports riots, 
and offers several strategic recommendations for police commanders when preparing for 
and managing sports events.  
C. VARIABLES  
The social identity theory provides the framework for understanding why people 
with nothing more in common than a brief meeting at a basketball game may quickly 
unite and commit acts that could arguably be outside of their normal behavior. By 
                                                 
4 Barry Pechesky, “Did Tucson Police Go Too Far Putting down Arizona Riot?” Deadspin, March 31, 
2014, accessed November 13, 2015, http://deadspin.com/tucson-pd-will-investigate-its-use-of-force-in-
putting-1555164766.  
5 Henri Tajfel, ed., Social Identity and Intergroup Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1982).  
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reviewing current data on crowds, specific to sports riots, a clearer picture of what causes 
these conflicts emerges. Some of the data includes case studies from police after action 
reports. The variables considered are in Table 1.   
Table 1.   Variables for Consideration  
Type of riot Group Behavior Police 
Political Formations  Attitude 
Social reaction (protest) Attitude Uniforms 
Celebration Leaders Equipment  
Frustration Reactions to police Response strategy 
  Formations 
 
 
Limitations to this research include limited data collection, such as demographics 
of the crowd time or day, and accurate costs associated with police preparations. Other 
limitations are a lack of data from “successful” operations or politicized after action 
reports that lack developed conclusions.  
D. RESEARCH QUESTION  
The Tucson Police Department (TPD) faced its first riot in 1997 following the 
University of Arizona Men’s Basketball National Championship Game when thousands 
of excited fans poured into the streets to celebrate. This celebration abruptly sparked a 
violent clash with police, resulting in damage and injuries to students and police.6 Similar 
incidents occurred again in 2001 and twice in 2014. Although the police department 
varied its strategies between 1997 and 2014,7 the clashes still occurred. Inspired by this 
                                                 
6 Kevin Danaher, 1997 NCAA Championship Game after Action Report (internal document, Tucson 
Police Department, Tucson, AZ, 1997).  
7 Danaher, 1997 NCAA Championship Game after Action Report; Richard Miranda, 2001 NCAA 
Championship Deployment (Board of Inquiry 2001–06) (internal document, Tucson Police Department, 
Tucson, AZ, 2001); Sharon Allen, John Leavitt, and Greg Roberts, Board of Inquiry, 2014 NCAA 
Championship Deployment (internal document, Tucson Police Department, Tucson, AZ, 2014).  
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conflict and others like, I began exploring different police strategies for approaching 
disorderly groups, which ultimately led to the question:  
Do collective behavioral patterns exist within the anatomy of a post-sporting 
event riot and how can this study lead to better-balanced policing strategy?  
E. METHODOLOGY 
The study begins with a detailed explanation of how police generally prepare for 
riots through an examination of training documents from several police departments: 
Tucson, Los Angeles, New York, and Seattle. Next, the study introduces two 
psychological theories show how people behave in group settings. Finally, data gathered 
from sporting events at several colleges across the country is applied to the theories to 
show patterns among the different events. Much of the data, however, has been gathered 
through boards of inquiry (BOI) and after action reports (AARs) surrounding events that 
took place at the University of Arizona between 1997 and 2015; this limited the 
examination of certain variables. Journalism articles documenting some events and other 
academic studies of sports violence provide some additional supporting data.  
F. ASSUMPTIONS AND BIASES 
Through the examination of the data, I discovered that police departments tended 
to report more on incidents that went awry, making it difficult to find data for successful 
incidents. Therefore, it may be difficult to compare data from unsuccessful incidents with 
successful ones, leading to bridging assumptions. It is also important to note that most 
studies of group behavior occur after the events through collection of evidence similar to 
the methods used in this thesis and without direct observation of the group dynamics as 
they occur. This creates the need for some scholars to create assumptions where the data 
could not be seen first-hand.8 However, I have witnessed two events and planned for 
several more. Although this may provide an advantage by applying first-hand visual 
confirmation, I also recognize that it may bias some of the data by creating assumptions.  
8 Jerry M. Lewis, Sports Fan Violence in North America (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 
24.
 6 
G. CHAPTER OUTLINE  
Chapter I includes a review of reputable literature beginning with general theories 
about violence and moving more specifically to sports violence. It also provides a history 
of social and psychological grouping theories to show scholarly opinions have developed 
into the social identity theory over the past century. Much of the theory discussed in this 
chapter is explained in further detail and referred to throughout the other chapters.  
Chapter II explains of how police plan for large events based on assumptions 
about groups and their claim that there is a lack of consideration for grouping behavior. 
This pattern becomes more evident through a comparison of policy from several major 
departments. Chapter II briefly explains how stereotypes, such as race, culture, and 
economic status, are bad predictors of riots. It also shows how police have traditionally 
used behaviors within the crowd to predict escalation and then asserts that this technique 
may be deceiving.  
Chapter III begins by defining the difference between a crowd and a group and a 
disturbance and a riot, and it establishes the difference between a sports riot and a social 
protest. In addition, this chapter provides the theoretical foundations for how crowds 
unite into groups surrounding sporting events, and it provides the framework for the rest 
of the thesis. Moreover, it provides explanations of social norming theory to offer general 
explanations how people socialize through the personal interaction, media, and social 
media to develop socially accepted behavioral patterns. The social identity theory 
provides an explanation to how people bond during a sporting event, thus creating a 
spontaneous in-group, and how this in-group unites against an opposing group (i.e., the 
police). Furthermore, this chapter highlights the same behavioral traits explained in 
Chapter II; however, it provides a more detailed explanation of their meanings.  
Chapter IV introduces several case studies from the University of Arizona, as well 
as a study from the Ohio State Task Force on Preventing Celebratory Riots. These studies 
provide data to support the social theories explained in Chapter III, and they establish a 
decision tree for identifying the stages of grouping. Additionally, this chapter also 
identifies some social conditions that influence violent group behavior, such as age, 
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gender, the need to centralize, and alcohol use. Finally, anonymity theory is introduced as 
a conditional factor, and data points from the cases studies show how each factor impacts 
grouping behavior.  
Chapter V provides recommendations, based on the presented data, for police 
managers to follow while planning for a sporting event to mitigate or prevent student 
riots. Some recommendations include better documentation, a more appropriate response, 
and further studies concerning grouping behavior. The concluding chapter, Chapter VI, 
discusses factors that may impact sports riots for future studies, such as how the time at 
which the game is played may influence the students’ energy.  
H. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The study of why people riot spans across several academic fields, including 
psychological, sociological, and criminology, with varying opinions and theories as to 
how and why these events occur. Overlapping theories, case studies, and opinions have 
created the need to simplify the research by narrowing it down to three categories: (1) 
types of riots, (2) grouping theories, and (3) documents of policing strategy.  
1. Types of Riots and Violence 
To gain a better understanding about the types of riots, it was necessary to 
research all types of disturbances, from political protests to disturbances on college 
campuses. For example, Tony Milligan’s book, Civil Disobedience: Protest, Justification, 
and the Law, provides an overview of how the Occupy Movement grew from a small, 
peaceful protest into a worldwide civil movement resulting in clashes with police.9 In 
another example, Stephen “Max” Geron’s Naval Postgraduate School thesis analyzes 
four Occupy locations across the country to identify aggravating and mitigating factors in 
policing strategy, setting the tone for a softer policing strategy more in line with 
community policing models.10 Author Gordon Russell separates political rioting from 
                                                 
9 Tony Milligan, Civil Disobedience (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), Kindle locations 98–
101.  
10 Stephen Geron, “21st Century Strategies for Policing Protests: What Major Cities’ Responses to the 
Occupy Movement Tell Us about the Future of Police Response to Public Protests” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2014).  
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sports rioting based on the ideology of the event; however, he notes that the same 
underlying social issues are present at both types of riots.11 There were many references 
in the literature to “celebratory” riots while referencing sports riots. For instance, Jerry 
Lewis’s book, Sporting Fan Violence in North America, differentiates between a 
“celebrating riot,” following a sporting event, and a “punishing riot,” which is a riot by 
the losing team fans.12 He also discusses the difference between college sports and 
professional sports, drawing conclusions about age and gender as it relates to certain 
types of sporting events.13 The Ohio State Task Force also repeatedly refers to 
celebratory riots throughout its study, although it clearly delineates that this phrase is 
more of a convenient label describing sports riots than a descriptor.14  
For the purposes of this thesis, a sports riot is defined as a crowd of people who, 
while in the process of celebrating a victory or commiserating a defeat following a 
sporting event, erupt into wide spread criminal behavior requiring a centralized police 
intervention. Isolated incidents, including isolated arrests, may occur during these events 
but do not rise to the level of a riot. These cases are not included in the data used to 
support the thesis conclusion.     
Evolving over the decades, the study of violence has produced enough theory to 
create an educational discipline. In the context of this thesis, gaining a better 
understanding of what makes people commit violent acts will serve more to refute some 
common misconceptions rather than attempt to provide causes. For example, in 1976, the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science published the Anatomy of 
Violence in Today’s Society, arguing that social conditions (poverty, education, etc.) 
were the leading cause of violence in society;15 however, another study argues against 
                                                 
11 Gordon W. Russell, Aggression in the Sports World: A Social Psychological Perspective (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 135.  
12 Lewis, Sports Fan Violence in North America.  
13 Ibid.  
14 Task Force on Preventing Celebratory Riots, The Ohio State University: Taskforce on Preventing 
Celebratory Riots (Columbus, OH: Task Force on Preventing Celebratory Riots, 2003), 
http://www.unh.edu/news/news_releases/2003/summit/OSUfinalreport.pdf, 57.  
15 American Association for the Advancement of Science, Anatomy of Violence in Today’s Society 
(Evanston, IL: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1976).  
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the social condition as cause, claiming that psychological behavior causes violent 
outbursts.16 These theories focus on the individual rather than a group. As a result, they 
fail to properly identify why people without psychopathic tendencies and people from 
affluent social condition may turn violent within a group setting.  
2. Groups and Collective Behavior: Historical Review  
Early studies of group behavior paralleled the limited perspectives of many 
scholars who explained the reasons behind committing violence by citing similar social 
conditions or psychological issues. Crowd behavioral theories date back the late 1800s to 
the writings of a select few authors who began studying the phenomenon where a crowd 
seems to override an individual’s ability to act rationally. Gustave Le Bon began the 
discussion with his theory of a crowd mind as the primary cause of mob mentality, which 
dismissed some of the earlier explanations that cited insanity, lower classes of society, 
and criminal behavior as the root cause of crowd violence.17 Instead, Le Bon argued, 
“crowds were composed of normal folk who, by virtue of their participation, were 
transformed by some unique, collective psychological process in the crowd.”18 
According to Le Bon, transformation occurs in several steps: anonymity, 
unaccountability, and invincibility, all of which alters the mental state of the individual.19 
This theory was widely accepted and laid the groundwork for a number of other scholarly 
writings, including that of Robert Ezra Park. Park felt that collective behavior was more 
related to social conditions and claimed that collective violence is simply a function of 
societal change in action or a form of “social unrest.”20 Herbert Blumer built upon Park’s 
theory that riots were simply social unrest, and he also agreed with Le Bon. He discussed 
                                                 
16 Sherrie Williamson, Robert D. Hare, and Stephen Wong, “Violence: Criminal Psychopaths and 
Their Victims,” Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science 19, no. 4 (1987): 454–62.  
17 Clark McPhail, The Myth of the Madding Crowd (New York: Aldine De Gruyter, 1991), 2.  
18 Ibid., 2.  
19 Ibid., 4. 
20 Ibid., 6. 
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needing a system of conditions for transforming an individual into a collective, thus 
identifying a step-by-step transformation.21  
Floyd Allport’s predisposition theory rejects the transformation theory that 
individuals transformed into mindless collectives, and instead he argued that people never 
lose their individuality. Allport concluded,  
A crowd is a collection of individuals who are [arranged more or less side 
by side and face to back and are] all attending and reacting to some 
common object, their reactions being of a simple proponent [sic] sort and 
accompanied by strong emotional response.22  
However, there continues to be debate about whether the crowd elicits an irrational 
emotional response onto the individual, or whether the individual brings a predisposition 
into the crowd. Allport argued the latter.23 This point suggests that everyone in a crowd 
participating in riotous behavior intends to participate, which removes the influence of 
the crowd altogether.  
Allport’s theory spawned another school of thought about crowd dynamics, one 
wherein learned behavior, social influences, and personal frustration drive the individual 
into riotous behavior while in a crowd.24 This position is partially supported by other 
social behavior theorists throughout the twentieth century, such as Muzafer Sherif, who 
argued that social interactions of the crowd created social norms that influenced 
individual behavior.25 More specifically, Sherif argued that people in a particular group 
tend to cooperate more with groups of similar interest.26 
Many of these opinions focus on specific variables associated with riots or 
generalize about the behaviors within a group (individual or collective), making it 
difficult to associate a specific behavior with a specific result. Modern scholars tend to 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 11–13.  
22 Ibid., 27. 
23 Ibid., 31. 
24 Ibid., 32–43. 
25 Ibid., 62. 
26 Fathali Moghaddam, Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations: Psychological Implications for 
Democracy in Global Context (Washington, DC: American Psychology Association, 2008), 83. 
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recognize the complexities of group behavior and how each different theory may add a 
piece the reasons. Recognizing how people identify with each other and the group seems 
to be gaining more traction among these modern theorists. For instance, Turner and 
Killian’s emergent norm theory agrees with Le Bon’s theory (highlighted in McPhail’s 
book) but disagrees with his notion of crowd homogeneity. They state that bystanders 
normalize the behavior of a few individuals, perceiving it as the dominant behavior, and 
thus recognizing it as appropriate.27  
In 1979, Henri Tajfel and John Turner introduced the social identity theory, which 
states that a person’s identity is determined by acceptance to a specific group.28 This 
relationship gives the person a sense of esteem and belonging, while providing the group 
with loyalty. This theory has gained traction by combining individual and collective 
behavior, allowing for more flexibility than social traits and psychological conditions. 
Social Identity and Intergroup Relations, edited by Tajfel, examines different social 
grouping theories over time, supporting some of the theories and refuting many others. 
He breaks down other authors’ opinions about how individuals turn into collective groups 
and simplified them into three stages:  
1. Social facilitation (initially coined by Allport in 1924) asserts that the 
mere presence of others has an “arousing effect on the performance of 
others.”29 Tajfel explains that there is conflicting reasoning behind why 
this occurs, leading to the conclusion that “contrary to the belief of 
Allport’s, this process cannot serve as a conclusive account of crowd 
behavior.”30  
2. De-individualization is the concept of losing one’s self identify to the 
dynamic of a crowd. In 1946, Jung argued, “being in a crowd leads to the 
loss of one’s individual identity, to an unleashing of the violent side of 
human nature in a ‘frenzy of unmeasured instinct.’”31 Over the years, a 
                                                 
27 McPhail, The Myth of the Madding Crowd, 65.  
28 Henri Tajfel, Differentiation between Social Groups: Studies in the Social Psychology of Intergroup 
Relations (London: Academic Press LTD., 1978). 
29 Tajfel, Social Identity and Intergroup Relations, 55.  
30 Ibid., 58.  
31 Ibid., 58. 
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number of studies were done to measure levels of de-individualization, 
including Zimbardo’s 1973 Stanford prison experiment.32  
3. Contagion is the spread of a notion or idea “can be seen as an attempt to 
account for the levels of homogeneity in a crowd in terms of accelerated 
processes of interaction or interpersonal influence.”33 
Tajfel argues that a majority of the theories approach the topic statically rather than 
dynamically, which “leads to the conclusion that, in a properly ‘dynamic’ prospective on 
relations between groups, the variables deriving from presumed tendencies toward 
achieving equity, from social identity and from power differentials should be considered 
simultaneously.”34  
Sigmund Freud introduced the concept of displacement of aggression theory in 
the mid-1950s to explore conflict between people. The theory explains that people are 
born with the basic instincts for sexuality and aggression. Over time, societal norms 
repress these instincts, but people never lose them.35 Freud’s book, titled Group 
Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, begins with an analysis of Le Bon’s theory about 
group behavior and adds a perspective of group psychology. Freud theorizes that people 
in groups are empowered by the anonymity of the group, overwhelmed by the emotion. 
He also distinguishes between two types of groups: one that is relatively temporary and 
another that is highly organized (military and religion).36 He argues that the libido or love 
for the group unites it and turns the group aggressively against opposing groups.37 
In moving beyond social theory into motivation, Elton Reeves’ book, The 
Dynamics of Group Behavior, provides an overview what motivates a group to form and 
remain a group. Written from a business management perspective, this book focuses 
several chapters on leadership and followership, in addition to conflict within the group. 
It highlights several key points, such as the importance of group cohesion and how 
                                                 
32 Ibid., 62. 
33 Ibid., 63. 
34 Ibid., 448.  
35 Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (New York: Vook, 1921), Kindle  
locations 103–104.  
36 Ibid., Kindle locations 366–368.  
37 Ibid., Kindle locations 162–165.  
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cohesion strengthens or weakens.38 Moreover, Reeves describes group motivation, with 
power as a main trait. He also discusses how power within the group is attained.39 This 
book spends little time discussing leaderless groups and tends to group both types 
together. Unfortunately, it also lacks solid data to back its claims, although Reeves cites 
other scholarly writings in support of his claims.  
3. Spectator Violence in Sports  
Answering the question about why people turn violent has spawned plethora of 
conflicting and supporting literature over the decades. In the context of sports riots, it is 
important to examine notable factors such as alcohol use, type of event, and other socio-
demographical traits to see if a simple reason for this violence already exists. Jerry Lewis 
concludes in his book, titled Sports Fan Violence in North America, that young, white 
males were more likely to riot following championships or important games than any 
other demographic.40 His study refutes that religion, race, and education have any more 
than a peripheral role,41 and his academic study offers data to refute earlier theories 
posed by Le Bon.42 
Arvind Verma wrote an article in 2007 describing different policing strategies to 
ensure public safety during public rallies or protests. Through the use of several academic 
theories for crowd behavior and “mob” violence, Verma attempts to provide police 
managers with predictive strategies to reduce clashes with crowds.43 He establishes that: 
The absence of police and/or their inability to control the large crowds 
enabled the people to congregate, organize and commit violent crimes. 
However, as soon as the police were able to gather additional personnel 
                                                 
38 Elton T. Reeves, The Dynamics of Group Behavior (New York: American Management 
Association, 1970), 107.  
39 Reeves, The Dynamics of Group Behavior, 69. 
40 Lewis, Sports Fan Violence in North America, 66–69.  
41 Ibid.  
42 McPhail, The Myth of the Madding Crowd, 2.  
43 Arvind Verma, “Anatomy of Riots: A Situational Crime Prevention Approach,” Crime Prevention 
and Community Safety 9, no. 3 (2007): 201–221.  
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and respond strongly, the mob melted and people ran away after a short 
confrontation.44  
The boards of inquiry following the 2001 and 2014 University of Arizona Men’s 
Championship losses, discussed in detail later, came to similar conclusions.45 
Gordon Russell’s Aggression in the Sports World is a comprehensive look into 
violence associated with sporting events. This book is scientifically and scholarly 
supported, and it covers a large variety of topics from theories behind violence to 
proposed mitigation techniques. Additionally, Russell not only spends time defining the 
differences between riots, crowd violence, and conditions surrounding both, but he breaks 
down a number of existing theories (those of Smith and Scott, Hutchenson and Drury) 
relating to sports violence. One theory is the “need for excitement,” which posits that 
boredom results in violence.46 This could be expanded to the student’s need to “blow off 
steam.” Russell also references L. Mann, who categorized sports riots into the following: 
“frustration, outlawry, remonstrance, confrontation, and expressive, the first letter of each 
category forming the handy mnemonic, FORCE.”47 Additionally, Russell also provides 
mitigations methods for reducing violence. Finally, Russell separates political rioting 
from sports rioting based on the ideology of the event; however, he notes that the same 
underlying social issues are present at both types of riots.48  
Todd Jewel, in his book Violence and Aggression in Sporting Contests, analyzes 
how the relationship between sports and violence from psychological and social 
perspectives. In addition, he theorizes that there is a higher propensity for violence at 
sporting events that have higher levels of violence in the sports themselves, such as 
hockey and American football, than in sports with less violence.49 Moreover, he supports 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 201–221.  
45 Robert Lehner, Kathleen Robinson, and George Stoner, Board of Inquiry, 2001 NCAA 
Championship Deployment (internal document, Tucson Police Department, Tucson, AZ, 2001). 
46 Russell, Aggression in the Sports World.  
47 Ibid., 147.  
48 Ibid., 135.  
49 Todd R. Jewell, Violence and Aggression in Sporting Contests: Economics, History and Policy 
(New York: Springer, 2011), 171–173.  
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his claim using evidence such game-day studies of violence surrounding a sporting 
event.50 Finally, Jewel also examines the economic impact of violence and sports. This 
particular book is more evidence-based, using statistics and academic studies than other 
references.  
4. Policing Strategies  
The University of Arizona has experienced three major celebratory riots following 
important men’s basketball games. In 1997, following a national championship victory, 
thousands of students and fans clashed with the police in the streets of a popular bar 
district. The 1997 after action report (AAR) and board of inquiry (BOI) provide details 
about the event, as well as police strategies and tactics. It explains how the Tucson Police 
Department (TPD) researched its strategy for managing future sports riots by examining 
the Miami-Dade Police Department, which is well versed in combating political protests. 
The 1997 AAR also fails to identify the type of crowd, assuming that it was comprised of 
“bar patrons and rowdy students.”51 This report did make some national comparisons; 
however, these incidents were isolated events at bars, political protests, and a single 
incident related to the NCAA tournament in Providence, Rhode Island.52 None of these 
events compared to the demographics, size, or emotional level as the incident at the 
University of Arizona in 1997. However, strategy used by TPD for the following decade 
was based on the two assumptions that 1) rowdy crowds and civil disturbances are 
similar, and 2) tactics used for suppressing political civil disturbances will be effective 
for celebratory riots.  
In 2001, another clash occurred in Tucson following a national championship 
defeat. Since this event was better planned than 1997, more research material was 
available. In addition to the AAR and BOI, detailed training plans and cost sheets were 
collected. The strategy following the 1997 riots focused on a show of force, equipment, 
and training; however, a large-scale riot, far worse than the 1997 riot, caused severe 
                                                 
50 Ibid., 176.  
51 Danaher, 1997 NCAA Championship Game after Action Report, 1.  
52 Ibid., 5. 
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damage to the business community and injuries to students, spectators, and reporters. A 
board of inquiry identified a series of missteps, including a failure to act on behalf of the 
command.  
In 2014, University of Arizona students clashed with Tucson Police following a 
Sweet-16 victory and again following an Elite-8 defeat. Each incident was investigated 
through an internal board of inquiry to identify areas for improvement in police response. 
The documentation provided by the board, as well as news clippings, internal 
memorandums, and cost analyses, were collected and analyzed as part of this thesis. The 
2014 police strategy focused again on a show of force, equipment, and visible presence; 
however, again the police were ineffective in preventing a riot. In 2015, the Tucson 
Police Department completely shifted strategy from that of enforcement toward a 
community-based policing philosophy. A “friendlier” approach began with gaining the 
community and business support to prevent violence rather than quickly suppressing it.53 
This transition to a softer style of policing could be seen as a trend supported by 
organizations, such as the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), committed to 
researching police strategy. In 2011, PERF published a best-practices series called 
Managing Major Events: Best Practices from the Field. Through a series of interviews of 
police managers, this magazine identifies best practices to a variety of high-profile 
events, including political protests and celebratory riots. The specific articles referencing 
sporting events focus on professional sports, although the lessons learned may easily 
cross over to college sports.  
5. Sports Riots  
Sports-related violence dates back thousands of years. While a majority of the 
research focuses of European soccer hooliganism, American sports have also seen large-
scale disturbances. Examples include the Rocket Riots54 and the Cleveland Browns Beer 
Bottle Riot55 where frustrating ends to games resulted in injuries, damage, and death. 
                                                 
53 JT Turner, “2015 NCAA Tournament Plans and Operations: After Action Report” (internal 
document, Tucson Police Department, Tucson, AZ, 2015).  
54 Andrew Clark, “The Rocket-Fueled Riot,” Maclean’s 113, no. 12 (2000): 70.  
55 Lewis, Sports Fan Violence in North America.  
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Information about the 2001, 2014, and 2015 NCAA Men’s Basketball Championships 
gathered through Tucson Police Department board of inquiries and after action reports 
provide the data points to show how the police reacted to the crowd, which strategies 
were used, and which ones were successful. Other data was be accumulated from the 
University of Wisconsin (2014 and 2015), the University of Kentucky (2014 and 2015), 
and the University of Florida (2014). Each listed year represented a time when the given 
university’s basketball team lost in a quarterfinal game.  
Team victories also come with violent potential. When the San Francisco Giants 
won the 2014 World Series, the streets of San Francisco erupted with celebratory fires, 
sporadic vandalism, and clashes with police.56 An examination of championship runs by 
the University of Arizona (1997), University of Connecticut (2014), and Duke University 
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II. A LAW ENFORCEMENT UNDERSTANDING OF RIOTS 
Social behaviorists have studied the madding of a crowd57 for well over a 
century, focusing on social characteristics, group dynamics, and theories relating to 
aggression. Simultaneously, police departments across the country have continued to 
confront angry crowds in a stand-off that often results in damages, injuries, and, in 
extreme cases, fatalities. Each riotous case results in a study of what went wrong, who 
was responsible, and how to avoid future riots; yet they still occur. There are several 
assumptions that lead to common misconceptions of a riot, which cause police 
departments to continually make strategic errors when planning for large events. This 
chapter highlights these assumptions and explores how they developed, and it also 
examines how police departments approach crowds, disturbances, and riots.  
A. CROWDS AS A THREAT 
Policing a crowd is a complicated and uncomfortable situation for law 
enforcement. Any situation where police are outnumbered presents a significant safety 
concern for officers.58 As the crowd energy increases to violence, the anxiety of police 
increases.59 A simple noise complaint at a pool party has the potential of escalating into a 
major incident. An example of this occurred recently in McKinney, Texas, when an 
officer responding to a pool party was quickly overwhelmed by teenagers upset with his 
response.60 The incident quickly went viral and resulted in political backlash against the 
officer and department, showing the public may not share the same perception of large 
crowds as police.  
                                                 
57 The madding of a crowd refers to how a crowd transforms into violent behavior. Clark McPhail 
titled his book, The Myth of a Madding Crowd and in his prologue, he refers to the poem “Elegy Written in 
a Country Churchyard,” written Thomas Gray (1750) that uses this phrase in the opening verse.  
58 Thomas D. Kitch, “Police Perception of Riot Activity,” Journal of Research in Crime and 
Delinquency 7, no. 2 (1970): 123, DOI: 10.1177/002242787000700202.  
59 Ibid., 129.  
60 Peter Holley, “New Video Shows Texas Police Officer Pulling Gun on Teenagers at Pool Party,” 
The Washington Post, June 7, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2015/06/07/new-video-shows-texas-police-officer-pulling-gun-on-teenagers-at-pool-party/. 
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Realistically, large gatherings occur daily across the country, and yet they seldom 
result in violence. In college riots, law enforcement officers are placed in precarious 
situations where they must keep the peace but must do so using the least amount of force 
as necessary and in situations where they are often outnumbered. A study of the Chicago 
riot following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King captured this dilemma, when 
outnumbered officers were forced to choose between allowing people to loot or placing 
themselves in insurmountably dangerous situations.61 Although isolated riotous incidents 
have received notoriety over the years, they rarely occur. As a result, crowds themselves 
may not be perceived as a viable threat.  
In 2007, Chris Bellavita published an article in Homeland Security Affairs 
highlighting best practices for organizing large-scale event planning, such as the Olympic 
Games. When outlining the threat picture, the article focuses on external threats like 
natural and manmade hazards.62 Bellavita lists security-related incidents, citing 
“demonstrations” as the ninth most probable threat.63 Another study of crowd safety 
examined gatherings at large sporting events. Although it focused solely on terrorist 
attacks, the author Gehring recognized that there are security gaps in large group settings 
and concluded, “Action now, both for mending the gaps in security in the present, as well 
as for preparing for well-reasoned, long-term solutions for the future.”64 Both of these 
authors identify large venues as potential places for terrorist violence; however, recent 
trends suggest that terrorist attacks are declining, while sports riots are increasing.  
Since the 1960s, there have be approximately 3,600 deaths attributed to terrorist 
acts compared to three deaths associated with sports-related riots.65 However, since 2001 
                                                 
61 Kitch, “Police Perception of Riot Activity,” 123–124.  
62 Christopher Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security: A Strategic Logic of Special Event Security,” 
Homeland Security Affairs 3, no. 3 (2007): 7.  
63 Ibid., 9.  
64 James Gehring, “Sports Venue Security: Public Policy Option for SEAR 4–5 Events” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014).  
65 Information about terrorist acts was compiled from known terrorist acts through Johnston Archives 
(http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/wrjp255a.html). The definition of terrorism may vary in 
interpretation however, altering final results. Information about sport related riots was compiled through an 
examination of news articles about known riots following sporting events.  
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terrorist attacks on U.S. soil have declined66 while sports riot have increased at an 
alarming rate. John D. McCarthy, Andrew Martin, and Clark McPhail published an 
article in 2005 illustrating this point by comparing violence on college campuses 
associated with protests versus convivial events (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1.  Temporal Trends in Campus Convivial and Protest Disturbances 
 
Source: John D. McCarthy, Andrew Martin, and Clark McPhail, “Accounting for Police 
Behavior at Disorderly Gatherings in Campus Communities, 1985–2002,” in Conference 
Papers: American Sociological Association (Philadelphia, PA: American Sociological 
Association, 2005), 41.  
Considering the number of fans drawn to sporting events, in extreme cases of 
rioting, the casualties potentially could be quite high. For example, in February 2012, 
Port Said, Egypt found itself engulfed in one of the worst riots in modern history 
following an Egyptian Premiere League soccer match, where the losing team fans 
attacked the winning team fans, resulting in 79 deaths.67 This potential for violence 
emphasizes the importance for police to properly plan and train for these types of events.  
                                                 
66 Ibid.  
67 Alejandra Ramirez, “The World’s Worst Riots,” Complex, October 18, 2014, accessed July 12, 
2014, http://www.complex.com/city-guide/2013/10/24-worst-modern-riots/jos-riots.  
 22 
1. Police Methods of Learning about Riots  
How police learn depends greatly on three factors: experience, training, and 
culture.68 Each provides a lens from which new strategies are developed and tested. With 
experience come certain assumptions or stereotypes on a subject.69 Stereotyping is a 
long-term evolutionary process that allows humans to quickly assess and categorize 
information.70 Law enforcement must recognize that these stereotypes may influence 
how police plan for and manage riots.  
2. Assumptions during Police Planning  
When dealing with a large crowd, law enforcement is responsible for ensuring the 
safety of all people involved. As simple as this sounds, the potential chaos involved in 
this form of policing forces police to simplify the situation. This generally causes 
leadership to create some basic assumptions for the planning process. The first and most 
basic assumption is that a crowd is a crowd; however, as shown throughout this thesis, 
crowds are different than groups within the crowds and that awareness of this difference 
can lead to a level of predictability. The second assumption is that crowds have an 
irrational mob mentality. Generally, most riots begin as a form of communication 
between participants and the government.71 While all riots seem to end similarly, they 
differ in participation, energy, and purpose. Finally, the third assumption is all crowds 
have potential for danger at any moment. Police training is based on worst-case 
scenarios, which sets the tone that everyone in a crowd is a threat. It will be demonstrated 
that this mentality, although necessary, may be contributing to a collective mentality for 
both the police and the crowd. In Psychology Today, Dominic Packer points out:  
                                                 
68 Harry W. More, W. Fred Wegener, and Larry S. Miller, Effective Police Supervision, 3rd ed. 
(Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing Co., 1999), 457–460.  
69 Hugo Gorringe, and Michael Rosie, “It’s a Long Way to Auchterarder! ‘Negotiated Management’ 
and Mismanagement in the Policing of G8 Protests,” British Journal of Sociology 59, no. 2 (2008): 187–
205, DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-4446.2008.00189.x.  
70 Fathali Moghaddam, “The Psychology of Fear,” lecture at Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey, 
CA, April 22, 2015.  
71 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, and Alastair Smith, The Dictator’s Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is 
Almost Always Good Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011), Kindle edition, 200.  
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Assumptions made about crowds tend to be self-fulfilling. Assume a 
unified crowd and you end up with a unified crowd. Assume a dangerous 
crowd and treat it as dangerous–weapons drawn, orders shouted by 
megaphone, heads knocked—and you get a dangerous crowd.72  
Police culture greatly affects police training and policy, and it creates a difficult 
obstacle to overcome concerning incorrect assumptions. Packer discusses a possible 
assumption by police that all “protestors are the same as a mob—unthinking, irrational 
and inherently dangerous.”73 He refers to this tendency as “unsophisticated policing;”74 
however, it has less to do with sophistication than simplification. With the number of 
incidents that police respond to involving non-violent crowds versus violent ones, it 
would seem more reasonable to assume that all crowds are non-violent. Although studies 
indicate that police culture may be influenced by outside factors,75 such a politics and 
public opinion, and that changing the culture may be a slow process. A brief examination 
of the history of riot suppression may offer more insight to this statement.  
3. A Brief History of Crowd Control 
Modern policing strategy for managing riots began with military strategy and has 
slowly morphed into what is commonly used today. With some of the earliest accounts of 
sports riots dating back to 500 BC,76 riot suppression occurred long before modern 
policing.77 Hence, it was not uncommon at this time for the military itself to be used to 
                                                 
72 Dominic Packer, “Assume a Dangerous Crowd and You Get a Dangerous Crowd,” Psychology 
Today, August 15, 2014, accessed June 14, 2015, https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/its-group-
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of Criminal Justice 31, no. 3 (2003): 199–215.  
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suppress citizen uprisings.78 Due to need to address the crowd efficiently, police 
departments often use military formations called skirmish lines, where police officers line 
up shoulder-to-shoulder carrying batons and shields as a line of defense to push back a 
crowd. The skirmish line, called a phalanx by the ancient Greeks, consists of officers (or 
soldiers) lining up shoulder-to-shoulder and moving in a synchronized formation.79 
These techniques continued developing over the years and eventually merged with 
modern technology during the Civil Rights era. Facing large crowds, police departments 
developed paramilitary strategies to move large crowds effectively using limited numbers 
of officers. Policing tactics have evolved over the decades, generally as a result of over-
reactions or under-reaction by police, which ultimately led to harsh criticism or lawsuits. 
During the Occupy Movement, the nation watched as the protesters effectively used 
social media and legal system to influence the way police approach complicated social 
issues.80  
Recognizing the ineffectiveness, police quickly changed strategies, from frontal 
assault, commonly seen in the 1960 and 70s, to the more patient style of policing, called 
negotiated management, which consists of open communication between police and 
protestors.81 Many new approaches to protests have come on the heels of new 
technologies, which, in some cases, have reduced the potential for injuries and damage; 
however, these new technologies can be very expensive, both financially and in terms of 
public trust. For example, the use of pepper spray (oleoresin capsicum) on protesters was 
criticized during the 2011 Occupy Movement.82 Advances in technology, such as non-
lethal gas and projectiles, have improved the effectiveness of moving crowds while 
reducing the need for policing to face off with rioters by increasing the separation 
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between the two groups. Although the overall police strategy has remained fairly 
consistent over the years, riot control remains a cat and mouse game where defiant 
protesters continuously adapt to police tactics, and the public continues to weigh in on 
favorable and non-favorable tactics. For example, the 2014 Civil Rights rally in 
Ferguson, Missouri that exploded into days of rioting resulted in harsh criticism of police 
use of military surplus equipment against rioters.83 This backlash caused President 
Barack Obama to issue Executive Order 13688, which restricts the type of military 
surplus equipment to be given to local law enforcement.84 
Strategies for managing crowds have developed over the years through a system 
of trial and error, where one technique worked and was carried down to subsequent 
protests. This method of sharing information allows departments to use knowledge of a 
previous event that occurred in a different location as the basis for a future event. 
Inexperience with high-risk events adds the traumatic impact on the community when 
negative results occurred upon conclusion. The United Kingdom has been managing 
violent sports crowd for nearly a century and has experienced the most success in 
prevention in the past decade. Jerry Lewis, author of Sports Fan Violence in North 
America, wrote, “American police are much less experienced at handling unruly sports 
crowds than English police. English police have developed a variety of skills that allow 
then to fine tune their responses to crowd actions and circumstances.”85 These 
approaches include centralized coordination, private/public partnerships, and in-depth 
studies about hooliganism.86 It is important to note is that hooliganism more of a generic 
term created by politicians and the media referring to rowdy soccer fans. Hooligan 
behaviors have been described as more organized than sports riots commonly witnessed 
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in the United States.87 However, due to media attention, college sport riots are commonly 
compared to hooliganism, although the purpose, method, and violent tendencies are not 
the same, making it difficult to borrow from the lessons learned in the UK.  
Currently, there are four primary systems used to managing large crowds (see 
Figure 2) that differ in design from very military to loosely military styles, depending 
greatly on the size and location of the crowd.88 A large majority of protests are smaller in 
numbers and are easily managed by moderately trained, unspecialized units, such as 
officers on bicycles. As events increase in size, or for emotionally charged issues, special 
units may be organized to assist. For instance, the Tucson Police Department uses a small 
contingency of officers trained in crowd control and protestor device removal, called the 
Rapid Response Team (RRT). This team of about 40 officers can be rolled into the 
Mobile Field Force (MFF), which is the next level of militarized police units. MFF is 
designed to push crowds using skirmish lines, less-lethal munitions, and tactical support 
(SWAT).89 Military forces, such as the National Guard, are only deployed when the 
rioters overwhelm local law enforcement resources.  
Figure 2.  Primary Systems for Riot Suppression  
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B. TRAINING, POLICY, AND STRATEGY  
Training and policy for managing large events and disturbances differs from 
agency to agency, city to city. As a result, the law enforcement discipline still lacks 
current, collective standards for training police officers to manage sporting event crowds. 
Many police departments have written policy for managing demonstrations and political 
protests; however, rarely does policy get any deeper than superficial overviews, mainly 
due to the complexities of each event, making training increasingly important. Examples 
tend to focus on chain of command, use of force, and other tactical considerations. For 
example, the Seattle Police Department manual gives the incident commander the tactical 
authority to achieve specific objective:  
• Containment: to confine a demonstration 
• Complete containment of a demonstration without a dispersal route will 
only be done as a prelude to a mass arrest situation 
• Isolation: to prevent the growth of the demonstration and to deny access to 
those who are not involved, for their own safety 
• Prevention of escalation: to defuse the situation through warnings and 
verbal persuasion 
• Dispersal: to disperse the demonstration in a predetermined direction and 
take enforcement action against violators90 
The objective for how to “prevent the escalation” seems to be left to interpretation 
by the commander. Boston Police Department (BPD) takes this a step further by 
including methods to de-escalating crowds. BPD policy manual reads:  
In crowd control situations where the demonstrators are engaged in 
unlawful conduct, the Department shall make reasonable efforts to employ 
‘non-arrest’ methods of crowd management as the primary means of 
restoring order. Such methods can be, but are not limited to, establishing 
contact with the crowd and obtaining voluntary compliance with police 
directives to minimize enforcement actions. Should such methods prove 
unsuccessful, arrests shall be made for violations of the law in order to 
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restore and maintain order, protect life and property and protect vital 
facilities and infrastructures.91  
The New York Police Department’s policy provides a “checklist” approach to 
managing an event,92 while the Los Angeles Police Department policy uses both a 
checklist reference and a more detailed method to managing large crowds and 
disturbances.93 However, often and as a result, each event is managed similarly, although 
these same complexities would encourage unique responses. Officers depend on specific 
training to gain a deeper insight into specific topics. In the case of riots, the training 
remains fairly generic by often combining different types of groups into a single 
category: rioters. One example occurred prior to the 2015 NCAA Men’s Basketball 
Championships by the Tucson Police Department. The training categorized a riot into the 
following four stages:  
• Casual  
• No common bond, interest, or purpose 
• Conventional  
• A deliberate and appointed purpose  
• Deliver a message  
• Hostile/aggressive  
• Likely to erupt into unlawful behavior  
• Riot/mob  
• Intensive excitement/agitation, loss of sense of reason and respect 
for law; follow leaders in lawless acts, anonymity in actions.94 
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Phase 1 is a casual, impersonal relationship between the individuals of the group 
but lacks a common bond or purpose. The conventional phase, or Phase 2, requires the 
crowd to have a “deliberate and appointed purpose,” or the need to “deliver a message.” 
Phase 3 is a hostile crowd “likely to erupt into unlawful behavior.”95 During Phase 4, the 
crowd experiences intensive excitement or agitation, resulting in a loss of any sense of 
reason and respect for the law.96 Although these stages lack support from any academic 
study when created, they were created based on the knowledge of three previous riots of 
which the Tucson police crowd management instructors had personal experiences, which 
is a common practice in law enforcement. When an agency lacks this experience, 
departments tend to take pieces of training from a more experienced agency and adapt to 
local needs. An example of this occurred at the University of Arizona in 1997 during the 
NCAA Men’s Basketball Championships when Tucson police contacted Miami-Dade 
Police for training recommendations for dealing with riots.97  
Some larger departments use specific strategies when managing crowds to prevent 
them from growing to unmanageable numbers. Once such strategy, called “command and 
control,” has recently emerged in local planning and has proven to be effective. 
Spearheaded by departments such as the New York City Police Department and the 
Boston Police Department, this strategy fragments the crowd into smaller sections using 
large concrete barriers or smaller metal pedestrian rails.98  
C. INFLUENCES ON TRAINING, POLICY, AND STRATEGY 
Although communities may share characteristics, every community is unique. 
This becomes more evident when questioning why one college town of similar size and 
demographic explodes in a riot following a rivalry football game while another does not. 
While one community violently protests perceived disparities, another may protest 
peacefully. Departments that share experiences to build policy must consider these 
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differences, or there may be unintended consequences. For example, while the Miami-
Dade Police Department is noted for having significant experience in civil disturbances, 
the city of Tucson is primarily a college town with significantly fewer political protests. 
At the same time, Tucson is a lively college basketball town and experiences sports riots 
following games.  
The United Kingdom has dealt with rioting following soccer matches for a good 
part of a century; however, it is only in the past decade have they developed the 
necessary tools to reduce the violence. One such tool is how the public perceives the 
rioters, or hooligans, versus how the public perceives the policing tactics to stop them. 
The United Kingdom has continuously created messaging through “political, media and 
legal discourse” that hooligans are “serious, damaging, and embarrassing” to the sport of 
soccer.99 Recognizing the safety issues, political fallout, and economic impact of 
hooliganism, police in the UK have taken a hard stance on unruly behavior.100 The U.S. 
often takes a slightly different stance.  
U.S. policing strategies are commonly criticized when conflict results in police 
use of force against the crowd. A good example occurred in Seattle in 1999, when three 
days of violence broke out surrounding the World Trade Organization (WTO) summit. 
The Seattle Police Department was harshly criticized for being understaffed and 
unprepared for the large number of anarchists who arrived to openly protest.101 At the 
same time, police in Ferguson, Missouri were criticized for overreacting to protestors 
during the weeklong Civil Rights protest in 2015.102 Norm Stamper, Seattle Police 
Department’s chief during the 1999 WTO riots, told the Washington Post, “We gassed 
fellow Americans engaging in civil disobedience…. We set a number of precedents, most 
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of them bad. And police departments across the country learned all the wrong lessons 
from us. That’s disheartening.”103 Once the police resort to using force against citizens, 
public opinion of the police is affected. Following the Ferguson riots in 2014, a Gallup 
Poll showed that non-whites who viewed police officers as ethical dropped 22 percent.104 
Even the hard stance of policing hooligans in the UK is not without criticism, even 
though it has effectively reduced conflicts with the police. A 2006 article published in the 
Howard Journal questioned whether Football Banning Orders amounted to overreaction 
by infringing on civil liberties.105  
D. FALSE PREDICTORS TO SPORTS RIOTS 
Over the years, scholars have examined traits such as race, religion, employment 
types, genders, and age to determine if one particular demographic leads to more violent 
behavior. In 1983, McPhail and Wohlstein examined the stages of gatherings and 
identified a number of useful social traits to riots. Although they admit their research is 
underdeveloped, it spawned other studies to compare riotous behavior similarly, such as 
socioeconomically indicators or existing racial tensions.106 In a hearing over racial 
disparity, the Kerner Commission concluded, “Today’s poor people find it harder to 
escape from poverty than 20 years ago. In addition to the worsening of poverty 20 years 
later today, there is a greater and widening gap on the basis of race.”107  
Conflict theories examine how difference in perceived equity among societies 
cause conflict and are used to explain how a community that is experiencing tension due 
to social, racial, and/or economic separation may use a sporting event to rally behind and 
find itself protesting over disparities. Even so, studies have found no evidence linking 
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race, education level, religion, or occupation as valid explanations to why people riot, 
only to why they may be upset.108 Several studies have shown age (early 20s) and gender 
(male) as a common trait.109 These conclusions have been substantiated in studies about 
hooliganism in the UK, although studies have also associated hooligans to the working 
class.110 This is something that has not been established in sports rioting of the United 
States. Other authors, such as Dunning, Murphy, and Williams, agree with this theory but 
expand it by arguing, “more conflict prone, and hence more violent, societies develop 
more extreme emotional dispositions and the dam for self control can be breached more 
easily.”111 Again, as a predictor, this theory would not apply to college students, since 
there is no known study establishing them as a “conflict prone” society.  
Another poor predictor for a riot is the location of the event and whether the fans 
witnessed the violence of the sport or a social injustice within the contest. In 1955, the 
Rocket Richards Riot was blamed on a perceived poorly officiated hockey and resulted in 
days of rioting.112 Perceived social injustices may also trigger violent fan reactions. In 
the case of sporting events, the referee is seen as the authority. This theory may be more 
similar to hooliganism, which academics suggests occurs initially as “sporadic violence 
inside the stadium directed mainly at referees and players;”113 however, in the case of 
Rocket Richards Riot, the rioters poured out into the streets, resulting in injuries and tens 
of thousands of dollars of damage. Again, these theories lack consistency for them to be 
valid predictors of a riot.  
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E. POLICE AGGRESSION  
Following the 2014 student riot at the University of Arizona, members of the 
media questioned whether the police response to student behavior contributed to the 
conflict.114 Realistically, police presence may increase tensions in all situations to which 
an officer responds. Recognizing this, police policies include “officer presence” in the 
use of force continuum.115 In an environment highly charged with emotions, the way 
officers dress, line up in a skirmish line, and move the crowd are all statements of force, 
and they give the police the ability to escalate or de-escalate the situations. Jerry Lewis 
refers to this as an “arena for the violence,” where the police aggression sets the tone and 
eventually escalates the crowds into a mob.116  
A study based out of the United Kingdom examined sports violence from the 
perspective of how crowds group together. This study concludes that current police 
training and crowd interaction in the UK are based upon LeBon’s classical view of crowd 
behavior, where normal people become irrational due to a few “agitators.”117 Although 
UK police attempt to identify the ringleaders, the inability to do so may result in the 
police addressing the crowd as a whole, thus creating the conflict they hoped to avoid.118 
However, to assert that police presence or that over-aggressive police tactics causes 
conflict is speculative, at best.  
While each of the previous examples may have found supporting data under 
certain situations that result in a sports riot, they all lack direct and conclusive causation. 
The next chapter will offer an alternative explanation using social norming and the social 
identity theory.  
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III. SOCIAL BEHAVIORS OF A SPORTS RIOT
If it’s predictable, it’s preventable. 
— Gordon Graham 
The 1997 riots at the University of Arizona erupted with little warning, making 
the response more reactive than proactive.119 Previous chapters discussed how police 
departments approach crowds, disturbances, and riots and how these perceptions may 
influence strategy. This chapter begins to explain how and why people group together 
under specific conditions, what leads up to this cohesion, and why it may result in 
conflict. It not only introduces social norming and the social identity theory as the 
underlying causal reasons for this behavior, it also begins to explain how this may appear 
during a sporting event. First, it is important to establish consistent terminology for 
crowds versus groups.  
A. COMMON TERMINOLOGY 
Some of the most influential scholars in field of social group behavior struggled 
with a common definition between crowd and group, often interchanging the two terms. 
For example, in 1924, Floyd Allport argued that a “crowd is a collection of individuals 
who are [arranged more or less side by side and face to back, and are] all attending and 
reacting to some common object.”120 In contrast, Muzafer Sherif, argued, “The 
individual in an intense group situation acts as a member of the group.”121 Defining the 
difference between a crowd and a group based on prior literature may prove difficult; 
however, conceptually there is a distinct difference in the two terms. A crowd is defined 
as a large number people organized together in one place.122 This generic definition lacks 
any purpose or ideology linking the people together. An example is illustrated with the 
119 Danaher, 1997 NCAA Championship Game after Action Report. 
120 McPhail, The Myth of the Madding Crowd, 27.  
121 Ibid., 63.  
122 Dictionary.com, s.v., “Crowd,” accessed: August 14, 2015, 
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idea of people at a shopping mall. Although a common reason to be at a mall is to shop, it 
is not limited to this purpose. By contrast, a group is defined as “a number of persons or 
things ranged or considered together as being related in some way.”123 The difference in 
nouns seems subtle, so it becomes important to examine the verb, to group, which is “to 
place or associate together in a group, as with others.”124 By including an association into 
the definition, this term provides a more precise distinction of how both terms can be 
used to explain behavior during a sports riot. Clark McPhail describes the concept of 
grouping as collective behavior:  
• Two or more people  
• Engaged in one or more behaviors  
• Judged common or concerted  
• On one or more dimensions125  
To illustrate, the previous crowd that goes to the mall for a particular event may 
include several smaller groups of people that arrived to the event together or met for the 
purposes of the event. The individual groups, when combined, amount to the larger 
crowd. Crowds can develop into collective groups at various stages of existence, from 
beginning to end, or at any place in-between. This process occurs through a basic 
psychological concept called categorization. Categorization is the basic form of 
stereotyping, where people quickly assess each other.126 A good example of this occurs 
during political protests in which the crowd that forms tends to already have a common 
ideology. Yet even in these crowds, not all individuals share an identical bond that leads 
to a group identity. For example, during the 1999 riots at the WTO Summit in Seattle, 
Washington, protest organizers complained that other protestor joined their groups and 
were interfering with their protest and “drowning out their message.”127 In a similar 
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notion, it is important to explain the difference between types of events, since the 
underlying motivation of the event may provide purpose for a particular group.  
B. TWO TYPES OF EVENTS 
Events may be categorized as one of two types: social change based events and 
non-social change based events (see Table 2). The differences offer insight of the 
ideology of the players before the event even begins. Social change based events are 
associated with movements of longer-term ideology or intent for social change, while 
non-social change based events lack these characteristics.  
Table 2.   Types of Events 
Social Change Based Non-social Change Based 
Protests Large parties 
Demonstrations  Sporting events 
Stand ins/sit ins Concerts 
Marches Celebration  
Political rallies   
 
1. Social Change Based 
Modern history in the United States has many examples of political protests 
involving large crowds. From the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s, to recent 
demonstration in Ferguson, Missouri and Baltimore, Maryland, large-scale protests open 
a gateway to potential violence.128 Participants in social change based events share the 
desire to change some social aspect in society. Commonly referred to as “social 
movements,” these events tend to follow a pattern of activity that was first described by 
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Herbert Blumer.129 Although these demonstrations both involve large crowds, they differ 
in purpose, mood, and ideology. Social change based events develop through two 
different methods: pre-planned and event-driven. Pre-planned events tend to be calmer 
with end-goal of making social change. An example of this is the 2011 Occupy Wall 
Street movement. Occupy Wall Street began as a peaceful and organized event, where 
decentralized leadership “formed committees and groups” and educated attendees on how 
to “effectively engage in direct action protests.”130  
Event-driven protests tend to be spontaneous, emotional responses to a 
controversial incident. The previously cited example from Ferguson, Missouri provides a 
good illustration, where a large demonstration resulted from a police-involved shooting 
of an unarmed African American teenager.131 As the event drew media attention, this 
incident grew larger and more emotional, the crowd turned violent against the police. 
However, these events generally signify larger, underlying tension, such as racial 
disparity or economic inequality, as in the case of the Occupy Movement in 2011.132 At 
times, preplanned events turn more spontaneous in nature, based on a number of 
variables, to including police response. Some examples include the Civil Rights 
demonstrations in the 1960s, the 1999 World Trade Organization protest in Seattle, 
Washington, and the recent riots in Baltimore, Maryland.133  
2. Non-social Change Based 
Non-social change based events lack the political or social ideology. These events 
surround celebrations, parties, or other non-political occasions during which people 
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would unite. Examples of non-social change based events range from concerts to sporting 
events. Since these events lack an obvious social or political ideology, they do not 
necessarily follow Blumer’s process of socialization.134 However, there may be 
commonalities within the crowd, such as the case with sporting events, where fans share 
a common admiration for the team.  
This thesis focuses primarily on non-social change based sporting events on 
college campuses, although it does refer to social change based incidents for comparison. 
A thorough examination case studies, academic studies, and government documents 
resulted in a pattern of behavioral change that shows student-led sports riots have two 
distinct, although overlapping, stages: normalization and social identity. These stages 
may be overlaid with the timing prior to, during, and immediately following a sporting 
event and may have overlapping characteristic (see Figure 3).  




According to a study by McCarthy, Martin, and McPhail, instances of college 
students rioting after sporting events have significantly increased in frequency over the 
past two decades, while the number of social change based demonstrations has slowed.135 
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While there is a lack of data to show why this trend is occurring, McCarthy, Martin, and 
McPhail suggest that it may be because the police have adopted a “negotiated 
management” approach to demonstrations but still use normal policing tactics for 
convivial events.136 Nonetheless, this only attempts to explain why student/police 
conflicts are occurring but does not address why non-social change based events are 
becoming a normal response to sporting events. However, social norming may offer more 
insight. 
Norms are standardized behaviors within a group.137 Generally, norms are 
established through tradition, although the process for creating and changing norms can 
vary from influence by the leader to the culture of the group itself.138 Members within a 
group quickly recognize abnormal behavior and reject it.139 This makes the process of 
norming is an important factor leading up to a sports riot because unless the students 
accept riotous behavior as normal, the riot would never occur. Therefore, it becomes 
important recognize how the norm is established.  
Social norms influence individual behavior throughout a person’s life. Berger and 
Luckmann describe this process as a social construction that occurs through specific 
social interaction, such as a child learning from his/her mother. Such lessons are then 
applied to the “generic other” (society).140 An example would be when a mother scolds a 
child for the taking a piece of candy without paying. Through this disciplinary process, a 
mother has now instilled the social norm highlighted by eighth commandment, “You 
shall not steal.”141 In Thinking, Fast and Slow, Daniel Kahneman denotes norming as the 
modeling of someone’s personal world, wherein associations that “link ideas of 
circumstances, events, actions, and outcomes that co-occur with some regularity.”142 Not 
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only does this process of creating social rights and wrong occur consciously and 
subconsciously through daily interactions, it “is the highest form of cooperative activity 
among group membership.”143 In the context of sports riots, the norming process begins 
with simple team spirit and builds into an identity.  
Turner and Killian introduced the emergent norm in 1972 when they argued that 
social norms guide behavior of a group through social interaction.144 Behavioral norming 
is a subconscious process of mimicking that begins long before the actual game. By 
interacting with others, people begin adopting traits, biases, and beliefs that translate to 
behavior. Even if some actions conflict with a person’s traditional values, through social 
norming, people will begin to accept new norms as resistance begins to fade. Philip 
Zimbardo gave examples of norming process in his book, The Lucifer Effect, when he 
documented the findings of the now famous Stanford prison experiments. Two groups of 
students (guards and prisoners) were segregated in mock prison setting for a week. As 
each day passed, the guards and prisoners developed a strong sense of group cohesion for 
their own group and animosity for the other. Although the controllers did not provide 
specific group norms, the players began to develop their own set of social norms quickly, 
which often conflicted with their own personal values.145 With regard to sporting events, 
several factors lead to social norming, including community support, media attention, and 
more recently, social media. 
D. SPORTS AND THE COMMUNITY 
Sporting events have a long history of uniting a community. From Friday night 
high school football games in the Texas heartland to European football (soccer), 
communities support, rally behind, and fight for their teams.146 Passion for competition 
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and desire for victory acts as the motivating factor behind this type of fan support.147 
Sportscaster legend Howard Cosell said, “Sports is human life in microcosm.”148 
Through the triumph and tragedy of everyday life, sports gives people hope, offers 
avenues for bonding with each other, and provides an escape from reality. Sporting 
events are also a way for at community to unite. It blends genders, professions, and 
socioeconomics together into one single identity, building a bond that in some culture 
begins at birth and may have the influence to inspire soldiers in times of war.149 The 
bond begins with team itself and grows with each year of anticipation. Sports also bring 
out the competitive nature in people. Ted Turner once said, “Sports is like war without 
the killing.” A notion followed loosely by many athletes and fans alike, sports 
competition has long been a forum for people to challenge each other, release tension, 
and remain in good physical condition. The athletes recognize that abilities can only get a 
team but so far. Other factors drive athletes to train harder and mentally prepare for to be 
champions. Jeff Pearlman explains this by writing, “In the world of collegiate and 
professional team sports, where so much emphasis is placed on talent, talent, talent, and 
talent (and, uh, talent), the thin line between victory and defeat is one composed not of 
muscle but mentality.”150 It is this psychological mentality that pushes athletes to 
compete at the limit of their abilities and helped Bert Bell, the National Football League 
(NFL) Commissioner from 1945–1959, to coin the phrase, “on any given Sunday, any 
NFL team can beat any other.”151 This drive also gives fans similar hope and is the 
driving force behind the emotional attachment to the team.  
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E. SPORTS AS A CULTURE 
The culture of sports in North America plays a part of how players and fans all 
react to the energy leading up to a game. In the U.S., large-scale violence during a 
sporting contest—similar to that seen in the UK—is rare. It is unknown why this is true, 
but it possibly due to the sporting culture in the U.S. For example, Jerry Lewis studied 
fan willingness to participate in a sports riot and determined that a large majority of 
sports fan were opposed.152 Roberts and Benjamin associate some of that to the U.S. 
norms, which simply rejects the notation of stadium violence.153 English soccer has a 
somewhat torrid reputation due to a small number of fans known as hooligans, who 
developed a reputation through the 1990s for random violent acts against opposing fans, 
players, and officials.154 In one particular example following a football match between 
England and Spain (June 22, 1996), fans gathered in Trafalgar Square to commiserate a 
loss. This gathering-turned-riot resulted in a number of deaths and significant damage 
throughout London.155 Although hooliganism is not seen here in the U.S., due to repeat 
media coverage, Americans are very much aware of the issues seen in Europe. 
Additionally, the United States has also experienced large-scale riots due to sports, such 
as the 1993156 and 1994157 Stanley Cup Finals. As infrequent as these events are, 
however, each event affects future fans. The previously cited Lewis study also showed 
that the number of students willing to participate in a sports riot tripled between 1982 to 
2004,158 showing that sports rioting may becoming more normal and accepted behavior. 
One author concluded that the “more conflict prone, and hence more violent, societies 
develop more extreme emotional dispositions and the dam of self-control can be breached 
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more easily.”159 The more sporting events that result in riots, the more permissible these 
incidents may become to mainstream society.   
F. MEDIA IMPACT ON NORMING 
Media has long been known to be an influencing factor on the public. The hype 
surrounding sporting events is no exception. The Ohio State Task Force on Preventing 
Celebratory Riots identified, “the role of the community, culture, and the media in either 
facilitating or inhibiting [sports related riots].”160 In a study about hooligans, the authors 
noted, “media hyperbole frequently has the effect of unwittingly orchestrating conflict 
through priming of aggressive schema.”161 A 1983 study by Carver et al., supports this, 
showing that through media priming, people who see “fellow spectators as threatening 
are more likely than others to become confrontational or openly aggressive.”162 Although 
these incidents may not have been published on the front page, each incident reported 
sets the norm incrementally. For example, game five of the 1984 World Series between 
the Detroit Tigers and the San Diego Padres grabbed national attention when the Tigers 
won their first Championship in 16 years. The celebration turned violent when fans set 
fires, flipped cars, and looted businesses.163  
Kevin Young identified this growing trend in 1988 when he wrote, “it is evident 
that violence in sport, both by participants and spectators, is considered by British and 
North America media to carry enormous ‘newsworthiness.’” 164 Media often has subtle 
influence over the outcome events. For example, snips of video showing students 
standing on top of damaged cars appear more like celebratory fun than criminal behavior 
(see Figure 4). Young addresses this specifically by writing that the media has a “role in 
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dramatizing and glamourizing violence, and in providing an often irresponsible 
interpretation of behavioural models for consumers (and particularly young children).”165 
Subsequently, incidents resulting from sporting events have increase dramatically over 
the last 20 years.166 Today, police use media relations to drive the narrative using a 
technique referred to as “image-led policing;”167 however, the rise of social media has 
created an infinite number of “citizen reporters,” which has changed the way the news is 
reported and disseminated.168 
Figure 4.  Post-championship Game Riots 
 
Source: Joshua Trujillo, “Photos: Arizona Championship Game Riots in 1997 and 2001,” 
March 31, 2014, accessed April 9, 2015, http://tucson.com/gallery/news/local/crime/ 
photos-arizona-championship-game-riots-in-and/collection_1ffcc542-b5f0-11e3-b4cd-
0019bb2963f4.html#0.  
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G. SOCIAL MEDIA IMPACT ON NORMING  
The aftermath of the 2011 London riots, which began as a protest over a police 
shooting, left destruction throughout several cities unlike Europe has experienced in 
decades.169 During this riot, some politicians blamed the use of Twitter as playing a “key 
role” throughout the five-day event.170 A report studying the 2011 London riot found that 
that Twitter was used to communicate information between social networks.171 Although 
data for social media is sparse, early studies show significant links between social media 
platforms and behavior. A 2014 study about social media’s influence in marketing 
determined that “social contagion induced from networked exposure can increase 
favorability assessments of ideas or products.”172  
Social norming does not have finite boundaries that stop when the championship 
game begins; rather it continues throughout the game and into post game, merging with 
the next stage, social identity. However, before this begins, there must also be certain 
environmental conditions.  
H. CONDITIONS  
Having the right situational condition is imperative for socialization to even 
occur.173 This condition may be quite complex when involving political and ethno-
nationalist perspectives;174 however, in the case of sports riots, it is created by the event 
itself. For a sports riot to occur, a series of situational conditions must pre-exist in order 
to create the draw into the area. Additionally, since these events lack the emotional 
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impact like social-change based events, the emotion must develop independently as the 
event is occurring. Three situational conditions that must occur include:  
• Game importance  
• Game intensity  
• Fan centralization  
Figure 5 shows the relationship among these conditions and how they may 
increase the potential for a riot.  
Figure 5.  Importance/Intensity Chart 
 
 
1. Game Importance and Game Intensity 
Important games (championships, rivalries, etc.) and close games provide more 
energy to a crowd than unimportant games and contests with a large score differential. 
When examining the statistics associated to sports riots, every event that resulted in a riot 
followed a championship game or a semi-final game.175 However, neither situation is an 
absolute indicator. For example, a survey of 32 universities concluded that 19 of those 
schools had experienced a riot in the past, while 11 had not. Of the schools examined, 
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every school but one had won a national championship in a major sport.176 Other schools 
that unexpectedly win games may also riot, even when it is not a championship game 
being played. Student burned couches shut down traffic after Dayton beat Syracuse in the 
2014 Men’s Basketball Tournament, although it was only the second game of six needed 
to win the championship.177  
The intensity of the game also factors into the possibility for a sport riot, although 
without additional research, this is only a hypothesis at best. Nevertheless, in 2010, 
researchers studied high school aged children in moments of controlled competition, 
concluding, “the highest levels of MBs (misbehaviors), mainly in the form of rule 
violations, occurred when the Intensity of the game was increased.”178 In combination, 
important and intense games increase the likelihood of the next stage occurring: fan 
centralization following the game.  
2. Centralization 
At the conclusion of the game, the fans pour into the street to celebrate the victory 
or commiserate the defeat. Within the stadium, this behavior is known as pitch 
invasion,179 and this commonly seen following basketball and football games or in 
European soccer matches. Despite a school’s attempt to keep the field clear for safety 
reasons, the students ignore the warnings and overpower the security. This issue has been 
attributed as side effect for schools making their fans a part of the action. A 2002 article 
written for USA Today about a coach arrested for striking a charging student 
acknowledges, “While the act is a time-honored college tradition and fans often are 
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scarcely discouraged, it has become so commonplace and such a safety concern that 
schools are rethinking their wink-and-a-nod policies.”180  
However, NCAA basketball and football championships are generally played in a 
neutral location. For these games, students congregate in bar districts or student housing 
districts. As the game ends, they centralize in the street to celebrate (or commiserate).181 
In 1997, the Arizona Daily Wildcat newspaper reported, “thousands of people flooded the 
city streets … and celebrated Arizona’s win by giving hundreds of high fives to strangers, 
turning over a couple of cars and streaking through the crowds of crazed fans.”182 
McPhail refers to this action as “clustering” when describing his theory of collective 
orientation for the group.183  
A lack of centralization would impede the environment for grouping to occur, 
hence stopping the process. However, even when the students do centralize, at the early 
stages they do so as smaller groups or as individuals. A 2003 study supported this notion, 
showing that 74 percent of the people in a pre-crowd assembling pattern after an Ohio 
State-Michigan football game were there with at least one other person.184 These three 
conditions (game intensity, game importance, and fan centralization) are more situational 
and environmental but are still commonly witnessed at sports riots. Other non-behavior 
traits are also commonly seen. 
I. NON-BEHAVIOR TRAITS: AGE, GENDER, AND ALCOHOL  
Age, gender, and the presence of alcohol are non-behavioral traits that are 
commonly blamed for causing riotous behavior. However, as previously discussed in 
Chapter II, these traits may be poor predictors.  
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1. Age 
The bar districts surrounding college campuses attract many different types of 
people, from the younger college students to the older fans and alumni. Due to the 
drinking age restrictions, the people in the bars are generally 21 years old and older, 
while the younger crowds either mill around the street during the game or back at the 
student housing locations. Immediately after the game, however, these two ages blend 
when the bars empty and the students leave their “apartment houses, dormitories, 
fraternities” to converge at the bar districts.185 It is difficult to show exact ages at events 
due to a lack of precise data, but a 2003 study of the Ohio State riot showed that the 
median age of arrestees was 22.6 years old186 and that “of those Ohio State students who 
were arrested after the 2003 post-Michigan game disturbances for destructive behavior… 
70% were either first- or second-year students.”187 The same study also notes,  
A common denominator of U.S. sporting crowd disorders, European 
soccer hooliganism, and the student riots experienced at Ohio State and 
other universities is that the disturbances typically have been instigated 
and carried out by young (average age 19) white males.188  
In a similar comparison, the median age of arrestees following the Richard Riot (a 
professional sport riot) ranged from 18–35, with a median age of 23.189  
2. Gender  
The gender of those involved also follows a hazy but present pattern. The Ohio 
State Task Force reported that 100 percent of the arrestees following the Michigan 
football game were male.190 None of the University of Arizona cases make distinctions 
between the acts of men and women, other than when women sit on the top of men’s 
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shoulders and expose themselves to the crowd.191 One study examined how people felt 
about rioting following sporting events, determining that “men were more likely to 
condone and enjoy a riot than were women.”192  
3. Alcohol 
Alcohol has long been blamed for increased violence at sporting events, resulting 
in many events banning its sale altogether. Although very little research has specifically 
been done to support this theory, extensive research supports that alcohol reduces 
judgment and inhibitions at even mild levels of intoxication,193 allowing for assumption 
to be made that the emotional impact of a sporting contest, combined with reduced 
inhibitions caused by alcohol,194 could result in altered behavior. Todd Jewel agrees with 
this principle in Violence and Aggression in Sporting Contests, writing that sporting 
events (football, in particular) and alcohol, when combined, “create a rather combustible 
situation.”195 In contrast, a study of hooligans determined this point to be false, arguing 
that although alcohol may have been involved in some cases, not all hooligans drink or 
excessively drink.196 The same can be said for college students involved in sports riots. 
The Ohio State Task Force concludes, “Alcohol certainly contributes to celebratory riots, 
but it does not necessarily cause them.”197 While none of these non-behavioral traits offer 
conclusive reasons for sports riot, each is commonly seen in the case studies, causing 
many to reach false conclusions about their involvement. A deeper examination in 
behavioral traits of the crowd provides more concrete reasoning.  
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J. SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY 
When people crowd into a stadium to support the home team, individual fans 
instantly connect to a common purpose. For instance, following the 1997 Men’s 
Basketball National Championship, one student told a reporter, “I’ve never seen so much 
school spirit in my life. This makes all the hard years at school worth it.”198 Fans all 
wearing the same genre of team colors and supporting their team create a level of 
connection. The social identity theory defines a social group as “two or more individuals 
who share a common social identification of themselves… [and] perceive themselves to 
be members of the same social category.”199 Membership into a group can be formal or 
informal, such as the case with sports fans. There are no social contracts, membership 
dues, or special privileges; however, members still create cohesion through the 
perception of belonging.200 Additionally, social identity theory establishes that members 
of the group immediately begin inflating the value of their group (in-group) and 
diminishing the value of opposing groups (out-groups), thus creating out-group 
discrimination.201 The development of social identity includes three distinct phases: 
social categorization, social identification, and social comparison.202  
K. SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION  
Social categorization is the human tendency to quickly assess and categorize 
others.203 Generally, when people think of membership into a group, it implies a club, 
civil group, a business, or some other formal institution. Group membership during 
sporting events lacks the formality of rules204 and as such is defined more through 
interpersonal associations. In the context of sporting events, the cognitive membership 
into the group begins with favoring one team over another. This places an individual into 
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a specific and separate membership, although separate subgroups may also develop 
within the main group. McPhail and Wohlstein refer to growing data suggesting that 
people tend to remain in subgroups with people they know, even after they join larger 
groups.205 In the context of sporting events, categorization begins when fans wear team 
colors to show support,206 but it also includes more complex behavior, such as the need 
to be near those with similar membership.  
L. SOCIAL IDENTIFICATION  
Social identification is an evaluation that occurs when members strongly and 
overtly identify with the group through primarily a perceptual or cognitive basis,207 
which can strengthen or weaken an individual’s membership. Simply wearing team 
colors begins the process of identifying with the in-group, but acceptance into the group 
requires a deeper commitment from the individual and acceptance by the group. 
Membership into a group has a very strong draw, according to Elton Reeves. He states, 
“membership into a chosen group is essential to the peace of mind of any man. He will 
set aside other consideration, except the most basic economic ones, until he’s been 
accepted by the group.”208 In addition, Tajfel and Turner explain: 
Where the ingroup lacks positive distinctiveness, member will be 
motivated either to leave that group physically, or dissociate themselves 
from is psychologically and aspire to membership of a higher status group 
or to adopt a creative and/or competitive strategies to restore its positive 
distinctiveness.209  
Moreover, John Lofland describes that individuals within a group constantly 
evaluate their “purposive action” to determine whether they have reached the goal or 
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not.210 It is important to note that the group itself defines the group’s “positive identity,” 
so it does not necessarily imply morally or socially positive. For example, members of 
“hate groups” define their memberships by the same measurements as any other 
group,211 although the identity and purpose is significantly different. Equally important is 
the notion that individuals may have different motivations for being in the group.212 This 
was evident in during the 1999 WTO protest in Seattle where some protestors 
complained about the motivations of others.213 The search for positive identity may not 
occur instantly. Following a sporting event, crowds are witnessed to be standing around 
waiting for the something to happen, a trait known by some scholars as milling.  
M. MILLING 
Hogg and Tinsdale describe process of milling as “people engag[ing] with each 
other, proffering their own account of reality and listening to others. Preceding a violent 
event, there may have been a prolonged period of ‘hang around’ where members seek to 
make sense of what is happening.”214 An identifying component within the milling stages 
is people searching for purpose within the groups by asking of questions or determining 
the certainty of an event.215 Blumer describes the observable trait of milling as people 
“standing or walking around, even talking about the exiting event.”216 Figure 6 gives an 
elevated perspective of University of Wisconsin students centralizing and milling in the 
streets following the men’s basketball team’s Elite Eight victory over the University of 
Arizona.  
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Figure 6.  Students Milling Following a 2015 Elite Eight Victory  
Source: “Photo: Fans Celebrate in Streets of Madison, Wis., after University Basketball 
Team Moves on to Final Four in NCAA Tournaments@Macy_Oswald,” Breaking News, 
March 30, 2014, http://www.breakingnews.com/item/2014/03/30/photo-fan.  
N. SOCIAL COMPARISON 
Social comparison measures attributes, comparing a person’s group (in-group) to 
another group (out-group) based on the emotional attachment to the in-group or dislike of 
the out-group. This comparison either strengthens the cohesion of the group or causes the 
members to reevaluate in favor of another group. In order to build and maintain cohesion, 
leaders must continually provide the group with its positive identity. Michael Hogg 
explains, “social identity is self-evaluative and derives its value from the evaluative 
properties of the in-group, social comparisons between groups are focused on 
establishing evaluatively positive distinctiveness for one’s own group.”217 This 
evolutionary process tends to exaggerate people in the in-group and minimize those in the 
out-group.218  
To better identify this process of socialization, analytical markers may be used to 
highlight key components of the group development. These markers were taken from 
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research on Mediterranean cultures and applied to the social identity theory by Brannan, 
Darken, and Stindberg.219 When applied to behavioral traits commonly seen in sports 
riot, these markers may help police commanders determine and possible predict the 




• Challenge response cycle220
1. Patron-Client Relationship
In traditional patron-client situations, this would be the relationship between 
a protective actor (patron), such as a state actor and the individuals (clients) who depend 
on the patron for protection.221 In the case of a sports riot, the students become the 
clients and the patron becomes the group itself.  
2. Honor/Shame
The honor of the group defines the worth or status of the group and the 
members.222 A lack of status may result in the members finding a new group. Honor 
comes in the form intergroup interaction (within the members of the group) and outer 
group interaction (with member of the out-group). Additionally, honor generally comes 
in a series of challenges. Police identify these challenges as traits (discussed later in this 
chapter).223  
219 Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, A Practitioner’s Way Forward, 84; Also see, Jean G. Peristiany, 
ed. Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965); 
Julian Rivers-Pitt, The People of the Sierra, 2nd ed., Vol. 55 (London: University of Chicago Press, 1971); 
John K. Campbell, Honour, Family and Patronage (Oxford University Press, 1974); Michael Herzfeld, 
“Honor and Shame: Problems in the Comparative Analysis of Moral Systems,” Man 15 (1980): 339–351; 
Bruce J. Malina, The New Testament World: Insights from Cultural Anthropology (Westminster: John 
Knox Press, 2001). 
220 Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, A Practitioner’s Way Forward, 84. 
221 Ibid. 
222 David Brannan, and Anders Strindberg, “Social Identity Theory Module II: What Is Social Identity 
Theory?” Internal online document; website not publically accessible.  
223 Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, A Practitioner’s Way Forward, 86. 
 57 
3. Limited Good 
Limited good is the notion that “social, economic, and natural resources exist only 
in limited quantity and always in short supply.”224 A limited good is generally seen as a 
resource, real estate for example, but may also be a group’s honor also.225 In all cases, 
limited good is a zero sum-game, one in which only one group can possess the good.226 
In a sports riot, the intersection of the street becomes the disputed property, and the group 
existence becomes challenged when the police attempt to disperse the crowd.  
4. Challenge/Response Cycle 
The challenge/response cycle is the interaction between the in-group and out-
group through a series of challenges and responses.227 The behavior of a crowd has been 
described in various reports as “changing” at a certain point throughout the night.228 This 
change may be as a result of a challenge/response cycle, where the in-group (in this case, 
the students) begins testing itself and testing the out-group (the police). Brannan, Darken, 
and Strindberg describe the challenge/response cycle as having three components: the 
challenge (an action or statement on the part of the group), perception (how this 
challenge is perceived by the in-group and by the out-group), and the response (the 
challenged groups reaction and the public’s perception of this response).229 As discussed 
later in the chapter, the perception of this challenge by the groups incites others to act 
defiantly against the police, who were attempting to clear the street. As the identity of the 
group develops, two factors influence members of the group into lashing out: group 
empowerment and anonymity within the group.  
                                                 
224 Ibid., 93. 
225 Ibid.  
226 Brannan, and Strindberg, “Social Identity Theory Module II.”  
227 Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, A Practitioner’s Way Forward, 86. 
228 Miranda, 2001 NCAA Championship Deployment, 16.  
229 Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, A Practitioner’s Way Forward, 96. 
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5. Anonymity 
As the crowd grows, the police tend to move away from the center into 
surrounding position where they can join together for safety and watch for criminal 
behavior.230 This lack of direct contact creates conditions of anonymity within the center 
of the crowd. The power of numbers makes members within the group feel stronger than 
the opposing group, which, in this case, may be police officers standing nearby. Philip 
Zimbardo refers to this as the “power elite” when discussing what makes good people 
turn bad when placed into a position of power over another.231 Anonymity within the 
group adds to the perceived power by removing culpability or the fear of being caught. 
Le Bon addresses this in his original transformational theory by claiming that individuals 
shed normal restraints that extend to the group due to anonymity.232 Other experiments, 
such as ones with children’s behavior on Halloween, also support that anonymity is a 
strong force within a group setting.233 This suggests that anonymity alters behavior in a 
way that would not normally exist. Tajfel disagrees, saying that since people in groups 
are known to others in the group, the state of anonymity only applies to outsiders.234 For 
example, they identified growing data suggesting that people tend to remain in subgroups 
with people they know, even after they join larger groups.235 As social norms allow 
aggressive behavior in group settings, such as sports riots, anonymity strips the actor of 
the last social control mechanism by reducing the fear of discipline. In a study about 
police and riots, Thomas Kitch wrote,  
Many people saw that we [police] were unable to do anything, and then 
began to loot themselves. A police officer is not going into a crowd of 50 
                                                 
230 Miranda, 2001 NCAA Championship Deployment (video evidence).  
231 Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect, 10. 
232 McPhail, The Myth of the Madding Crowd, 3.  
233 A study of de-individualization caused by anonymity. The original study was performed by Ed 
Diener et al. in “Effects of Deindividualization Variables on Stealing among Halloween Trick-or-Treaters” 
quoted in Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect, 302.    
234 Tajfel, Social Identity and Intergroup Relations, 51.  
235 McPhail, and Wohlstein, “Individual and Collective Behaviors during Riots,” 594.  
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to 100 people alone if he is afraid to use the force necessary to stop looting 
and also to protect his own life.236 
LAPD Deputy Chief Patrick Gannon addressed this issue in the Police Executive 
Research Forum (PERF) when he stated, “crowds celebrating a sporting event are 
different from political demonstrators. You need to be proactive. If you just line up police 
officers as a wall against the crowd during a sports celebration, you’re going to have 
problems.”237 Conditions of anonymity set the tone for the next condition: group 
empowerment. 
6. Group Empowerment  
At this point, individuals within the group begin experimenting with anonymity 
by testing the group and the police, who are standing by watching or cannot see into the 
group at all due to the number of students. As previously discussed, the 
challenge/response cycle is seen as a series of tests that the in-group presents to the out-
group.238 In this setting, these tests are initially presented as morally unacceptable acts 
and eventually escalate to illegal acts. Police recognize these challenges as “triggers” or 
traits that suggest a riot is pending.239 For example, shouldering is the concept of people, 
usually women, climbing on the shoulders of men to get a better view of the action within 
the group. As the group builds energy, chants from the group encourage the women to 
expose themselves to the crowd. Under normal circumstances, merely asking women to 
do this is an unacceptable practice; however, anonymity sheds the individual of the moral 
restriction. As the crowd reacts to the shouldered women in cheers and encouragement, 
some women react by fulfilling the request, even understanding the repercussions (self-
degradation and possibility of arrest). Freud explains this concept of getting caught up in 
the moment as an act of contagion when he wrote, “in a group every sentiment and act is 
                                                 
236 Kitch, “Police Perception of Riot Activity,” 124.  
237 Patrick Gannon, Managing Major Events: Best Practices from the Field, Police Executive 
Research Forum, 2011, http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series/managing 
%20major%20events%20-%20best%20practices%20from%20the%20field%202011.pdf, 14, 15.  
238 Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, A Practitioner’s Way Forward, 86. 
239 Miranda, 2001 NCAA Championship Deployment, 34–35. 
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contagious, and contagious to such a degree that an individual readily sacrifices his 
personal interest to the collective interest.”240 
A number of common behavior traits are seen as groups develop cohesion (see 
Figure 7). Providing the proper context for the traits is imperative for correct 
interpretation. Police departments commonly focus on several different easily identifiable 
traits but may misinterpret what they actually indicate. For example, behaviors such as 
“fighting or throwing objects” may lead to the “police to take enforcement action,”241 
even though the trigger may not influence a particular crowd response.242 For example, 
while it is true that a single fight seldom results in a riot, a single fight among other 
behaviors may result in an escalation of behaviors resulting in riotous conditions. Clark 
McPhail identified this trait as “surging.”243 Rather than saying that Person A fighting 
leads to X condition, McPhail simply identifies fighting as a commonly seen trait of 
common velocity within a crowd. Surging may end in a fight, but he focuses more on the 
crowd behavior than individual traits within the crowd.244  
                                                 
240 Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, Kindle locations 110–111.  
241 Miranda, 2001 NCAA Championship Deployment, 34. 
242 Ibid., 35. 
243 McPhail, The Myth of the Madding Crowd, 169.  
244 Ibid.  
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Figure 7.  Commonly Seen Traits during a Sports Riot 
 
 
The first honor challenge occurs when the students centralize in the street. Under 
normal circumstances, standing in the middle of an intersection or rushing the field is 
prohibited by law; however, this occurs regularly as a result of students centralizing in 
the streets following a sporting event. This location also becomes the limited good, since 
it is a place controlled by the police, taken by the students, only to be retaken by the 
police.245 Chanting is one of the more common traits observed when the students first 
centralize. Referred to a “collective verbalization,”246 the act stands for more than simply 
cheering for one’s team. Researchers have shown that the escalation of tones and 
synchronization of words has an emotional component that brings people together.247 
Chanting for a team is common in the beginning stages of a crowd developing identity. 
While some studies suggest that the noise itself increases aggression,248 others suggest 
                                                 
245 Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, A Practitioner’s Way Forward, 93. 
246 McPhail, The Myth of the Madding Crowd, 164. 
247 Ibid., 166.  
248 Russell, Aggression in the Sports World, 78. 
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that chanting, in combination with other nonverbal cues, such as clinching the fist, is a 
display of solidarity and power.249 Students chant positive phrases in unison, such as “U 
of A,”250 but depending on the mood of the crowd, phrases can quickly turn negative. For 
instance, in 2001, Arizona students quickly began chanting “Fuck Duke,”251 as they did 
in 2014 and again in 2015 after losing to Wisconsin.252 These acts may seem benign; 
however, both are social infractions (or illegal) and have a psychological impact on the 
students. Gordon Russell suggests in his book, Aggression in the Sports World, 
“Negatively toned interpretations [of songs and chants] may prompt a stronger than usual 
aggressive response to an individual, therefore setting the stage for an upward spiral of 
increasingly antisocial exchanges.”253 There may be a delinquency impact of angry 
chants, also. The act of standing in the street is a mildly delinquent act and under normal 
conditions would be socially rejected. However, as discussed previously, social norms are 
incrementally changed. This delinquent act involves an impersonal object and has a clear 
separation from serious delinquency where an interpersonal relation may exist, such as 
assault or arson.254  
Each individual action that goes unchallenged by authorities adds to the group 
cohesion and encourages additional challenges, which quickly push into unlawful acts. 
Commonly seen behaviors at this stage include:  
• Shouldering  
• Flashing  
• Climbing  
• Street lights and street signs 
• Pyrotechnics  
                                                 
249 McPhail, The Myth of the Madding Crowd, 167.  
250 Miranda, 2001 NCAA Championship Deployment, 14.  
251 Ibid.  
252 Jazmine Foster-Hall, “Fans Riot on University Boulevard after Elite Eight Loss,” Arizona Wildcat, 
March 30, 2014, http://www.wildcat.arizona.edu/article/2014/03/fans-riot-on-university-boulevard-after-
elite-eight-loss. 
253 Russell, Aggression in the Sports World, 32–33.  
254 John Finley Scott, “Two Dimensions of Delinquent Behavior,” American Sociological Review 24, 
no. 2 (1959): 242.  
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• Smoke bombs 
• Fireworks255  
Escalation to aggravated levels of behavior strongly depends on the group’s 
acceptance of the previous behavior. Tajfel and Turner describe this process as having 
three components:  
A cognitive component, in the sense to the knowledge that one belongs to 
a group; an evaluative one, in the sense that the notion of the group and/or 
one’s membership may have a positive or negative value connotation; and 
an emotional component in the sense that the cognitive and evaluative 
aspects of the group and one’s membership of it may be accompanied by 
emotion directed toward one’s own group…256  
If the group encourages the behavior by circularing,257 chanting, and increasing 
energy, the behaviors will escalate; however, individuals within the group could also 
reject behavior. This may occur when the group cohesion has not risen to a level where 
the norms haven not anchored, or when members reject the purpose of the group.258 If 
the members find positive value through the challenges, cohesion continues to build to 
the point that criminal behavior is an acceptable practice, including violence within the 
group and focused on out-groups.259 Other examples of behavioral traits include:  
• Minor vandalism (to street signs and streetlights).  
• Mosh pits—violent dancing  
• Minor arson  
• Small fires  
• Burning couches260  
                                                 
255 This list was developed through examinations of news articles, and the case studies featured in this 
thesis.  
256 Tajfel, Differentiation between Social Groups, 28. 
257 Circularing occurs when individuals converge and focus on a particular stimulus, such two people 
fighting within a group. McPhail refers to this concept as arcing or ringing. See McPhail, The Myth of the 
Madding Crowd, 165. 
258 Tajfel, Differentiation between Social Groups, 64. 
259 Ibid.  
260 This list was developed through examinations of news articles, and the case studies featured in this 
thesis.  
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7. The Out-Group 
As previously discussed, the grouping tendency within the social categorization 
creates distinctions between groups.261 Curiously, Tajfel and Turner use the particular 
phrase, “us and they” to describe this social division.262 Police have used a similar term 
to describe a condition where the police create an adversarial connection with the 
community.263 While the students continue to develop their identity as a cohesive group, 
the police identity has already been developed. This occurs through police socialization, 
which begins in the academy and continues throughout an officer’s career.264 Tajfel and 
Turner describe identity as “self-concept which derives from …knowledge 
of…membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional 
significance attached to that membership.”265 Membership to the police department is 
formal, structured, and exclusive. Furthermore, it strengthens as a result of shared 
experiences among officers.266 It also represents a completely different set of values than 
the student population.  
From the point the game ends and the students centralize in the streets, social 
identification occurs; however, until an in-group/out-group conflict occurs, the 
relationship remains amicable. Once a dispute over a limited good occurs, the conflict 
grows. Chapter IV will apply several case studies to the two social theories to show how 
social norming and social identity influence behavior surrounding sporting events.  
                                                 
261 Tajfel, Differentiation between Social Groups, 62. 
262 Ibid.  
263 This phrase is commonly used in law enforcement to denote a separation between the police and 
the community, although its origination is unknown.  
264 John van Maanen, and Edgar H. Schein, “Toward a Theory of Organizational Socialization,” 
Research in Organizational Behavior 1 (January 1979): 209–211.  
265 Tajfel, Differentiation between Social Groups, 63. 
266 Matthew D. Hanley, “Killing Barney Fife: Law Enforcement’s Socially Constructed Perception of 




Serious sport has nothing to do with fair play. It is bound up with hatred, 
jealousy, boastfulness, disregard of all rules, and sadistic pleasure in 
witnessing violence: in other words, it is war without the shooting. 
— George Orwell,  Collected Essays, 
Journalism and Letters of George Orwell 
The case studies supporting the hypothesis is limited to college basketball 
sporting events primarily at the University of Arizona in 1997, 2001, 2014 (twice), and 
2015, where the men’s basketball team advanced to at least the quarterfinal round (Elite 
8). Other incidents studied include the University of Wisconsin, University of Florida, 
University of Kentucky, and University of Connecticut, although the information is 
limited. Newspaper articles and other research also provide data supporting the case 
studies where details may be missing. The case studies are categorized into three 
segments, conditions, normalization stage, and social identity stage, rather than by the 
year of the event. Each of the events are presented by the year of occurrence: 1997, 2001, 
2014, and 2015. The chapter begins with an explanation of the variables that affect 
events, but it falls short of providing a definitive cause of the behavior. Finally, the 
chapter concludes with examples of grouping behavior modeled by the social identity 
theory.  
A. TYPES OF EVENTS 
Since each case study is a sporting event, they will all be classified as a non-social 
change based event, as defined in Chapter III. These events lack an underlying desire to 
change some social component. Additionally, the sporting events are all NCAA men’s 
basketball games leading up the championship game. The phrase “Sweet Sixteen” refers 
the point in the tournament where only 16 teams remain in the single elimination format. 
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“Elite Eight” refers to the final eight teams, and “Final Four” refers to the last four 
teams.267 
B. GEOGRAPHIC COMPARISONS 
The data for the geographic comparison is comprised of the teams represented in 
the 2014 NCAA Men’s Basketball Championship (Kentucky, Connecticut, Florida, and 
Wisconsin), plus the University of Arizona. The purpose of this comparison is to show 
city population, student enrollment, size of police departments, and type of police 
training discover any patterns.  
The University of Arizona is located in the Tucson, Arizona. The population 
within the city limits is 527,792268 and approximately one million when including the 
surrounding county.269 The University of Arizona averages total population of about 
40,000 students per year, an average tuition of $10,400 in-state, and $27,400 out-of-
state.270 Due to the history of sports riots, the student bar districts are policed by the 
Tucson Police Department, the University of Arizona Police Department, the Arizona 
Department of Public Safety, and the Pima County Sheriffs Department. The Tucson 
Police Department has primary jurisdiction over the area. The University of Arizona 
basketball team experienced sports riots in 1997, 2001, and 2014 (twice). In 2015, there 
were no student riots. 
267 The terms Sweet Sixteen, Elite Eight, and Final Four are trademarked by the NCAA and the 
Illinois High School Association through a joint venture named the March Madness Athletic Association. 
“NCAA Dominates Ownership of Such Familiar Terms as ‘March Madness,’ ‘Sweet Sixteen,’ ‘Elite 
Eight,’ ‘Final Four,’” accessed November 24, 2015, http://www.ibj.com/articles/2204-ncaa-dominates-
ownership-of-such-familiar-terms-as-march-madness-sweet-sixteen-elite-eight-final-four. 
268 Data derived from “Population Estimates, American Community Survey, Census of Population and 
Housing, County Business Patterns, Economic Census, Survey of Business Owners, Building Permits, 
Census of Governments,” U.S. Census Bureau: State and County QuickFacts, May 28, 2015, accessed May 
28, 2015, http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml. Taken from 2014 
estimations. 
269 Data derived from “Population Estimates, American Community Survey, Census of Population and 
Housing, State and County Housing Unit Estimates, County Business Patterns, Nonemployer Statistics, 
Economic Census, Survey of Business Owners, Building Permits, accessed May 28, 2015, U.S. Census 
Bureau: State and County QuickFacts, http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts. 
xhtml#none. Taken from 2014 estimations.  
270 JT Turner, “2014 NCAA Elite 8 Game: Tucson Police Department, City Visits Debriefing,” 
presented at the NCAA Elite 8 Debriefing, Tucson, AZ, April 2014. 
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University of Florida is located in Gainesville, Florida—46 square miles and 
home to 125,000 permanent residents. The University of Florida adds an additional 
60,000 to the total population from students living in Gainesville area. The Gainesville 
Police Department employs 300 sworn officers and a command staff comprised of a 
police chief, a major, and three captains. The University of Florida Police Department has 
90 sworn officers, a police chief, and two majors.271 For the last 20 years, neither 
department trains its officers in mobile field force (MFF) tactics.272  
University of Wisconsin, located in Madison, Wisconsin, has 240,323 permanent 
residences in the city limits, and 568,593 of them live in the metropolitan area. In 
addition, the university has a student population of 42,000. The Madison Police 
Department (MPD) has 443 sworn officers. During Final Four preparations, MPD is 
assisted by Wisconsin University Police Department, Dane County Sheriff’s Department, 
the Wisconsin State Police, and the Wisconsin Capital Police..273  
The University of Kentucky, located in Lexington, Kentucky has 29,000 students, 
and there are 300,000 permanent residents in the surrounding area. With 540 sworn 
officers covering 280 square miles of territory, the Lexington Police Department is the 
largest of the previously listed departments.274  
The University of Connecticut (UConn) is located in Storrs, Connecticut. It is a 
small community by comparison to the other locations with about 25,000 permanent 
residents. UConn enrolls 25,000 students annually. The University of Connecticut Police 
Department has primary jurisdiction and 76 sworn officers, and the Connecticut State 
Police, with 27 sworn officers, assist them.275 Table 3 compares the five different college 
campuses relating to the size of the department, the size of the city, the student 
population for each school, and number of officers used in the 2014 NCAA Final Four. 
                                                 
271 Ibid.  
272 MFF is a common name for units trained specifically for quelling riots. 
273 Turner, “2014 NCAA Elite 8 Game.”  
274 Ibid.  
275 Ibid.  
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The purpose of this data is to show visually how each differs in population, department 
size, and preparation for the NCAA men’s basketball tournament.  
Table 3.   2014 Men’s Basketball Final Four Universities 
Source: Turner, “2014 NCAA Elite 8 Game.”  
Table 4 is a comparison of strategies used by the different cities. All five schools 
used mitigation methods278 to reduce potential damage and injury during the 2014 
NCAA tournament. Three of the five schools have a history of clashes between students 
                                                 
276 The operation is supplemented with other officers from outside agencies. The exact number was 
not provided.  
277 This number denotes the number of officers used in the NCAA tournament, not the total number of 
officers available. Allen, Leavitt, and Roberts, Board of Inquiry, 2014 NCAA Championship Deployment, 
4.  
278 Mitigation strategies in this context refer to mandatory clearing of vehicles from streets in the 
affected areas, removing burnable items (couches, trashcans, etc.), and removing possible projectiles. This 
also means contacting the local businesses to establish common rules and practices to reduce the change of 
damage and violence.  
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and police. Only the University of Arizona specifically trains for NCAA Championship 
related disturbances; however, this school has had a high comparative number of sports 
related riots directly related to the NCAA men’s basketball tournament since the mid-
1990s. The initial expectation of this comparison was see how police preparation, history 
of incidents at the schools, or a lack of mitigation affected the potential for violence; 
however, there is no clear pattern. 
Table 4.   2014 NCAA Men’s Basketball Strategic Comparison 




















NCAA training  Yes Yes Yes Yes 10/0 
University 




No Yes Yes No No 0/0 
University 
of Arizona  




Yes No Yes Yes 15/3 
Source: Turner, “2014 NCAA Elite 8 Game.”  
Table 5 shows a comparative history of the number of appearances by each school 
at the NCAA men’s basketball tournament as well as which games ended in a sports riot 
between 1997 and 2015. The comparison shows that riots do not occur at all of the 
schools that were studied.  
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Table 5.   NCAA Appearances versus Riot Comparison 




1999 Lost in Final Four No 
 2000 Lost in championship No 
 2006 Won championship No 
 2007 Won championship No 
 2011 Lost in Elite 8 No 
 2012 Lost in Elite 8 No 
 2013 Lost in Elite 8 No 
 2014 Lost in Final 4  No 
University of 
Wisconsin280  
2000 Lost in Final 4  No 
 2005 Lost in Elite 8 No 
 2014 Lost in Final 4 No281 
 2015 Lost in championship No 
University of 
Kentucky282 
1997 Lost in championship No 
 1998 Won championship No 
 1999 Lost in Elite 8 No 
 2003 Lost in Elite 8 No 
 2005 Lost in Elite 8 No 
 2010 Lost in Elite 8 No 
 2011 Lost in Final 4 No 
                                                 
279 “NCAA Basketball Tournament History: Florida Gators,” ESPN, accessed August 24, 2015, 
http://espn.go.com/mens-college-basketball/tournament/history/_/team1/5987.  
280 “NCAA Basketball Tournament History: Wisconsin Badgers,” ESPN, accessed August 24, 2015, 
http://espn.go.com/mens-college-basketball/tournament/history/_/team1/8023.  
281 For 2014 and 2015, a detailed email to this author by Captain Thomas Snyder, Madison Police 
Department, which described students’ behavior as similar to that described in this thesis. However, each 
incident was isolated, and none resulted in large clashes with police.  
282 “NCAA Basketball Tournament History: Kentucky Wildcats,” ESPN, accessed August 24, 2015, 
http://espn.go.com/mens-college-basketball/tournament/history/_/team1/6313.  
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School  NCAA Appearance  Final Game in Appearance  Riot Following 
Game 
 2012 Won championship Yes 
 2014 Lost in championship Yes 
 2015 Lost in Final 4 Yes 
University of 
Connecticut283 
1999 Won championship No 
 2004 Won championship Yes 
 2011 Won championship Yes 
 2014 Won championship Yes 
University of 
Arizona284 
1997 Won championship Yes 
 2001 Lost championship Yes 
 2003 Lost in Elite 8 No 
 2011 Lost in Elite 8 No 
 2014 Won Sweet 16 Yes 
 2014 Lost Elite 8 Yes 
 2015 Lost Elite 8 No 
 
C. UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA AREA ANALYSIS  
In April 1997, the University of Arizona Men’s Basketball team played in its first 
national championship game against the University of Kentucky. The energy leading up 
to the game was captured in newspapers and television coverage throughout the 
tournament. In 1997 and 2001, the 4th Avenue bar districts in Tucson drew the largest fan 
base for watching the game due to the proximity to University of Arizona campus,285 
                                                 
283 “NCAA Basketball Tournament History: Connecticut Huskies,” ESPN, accessed August 24, 2015, 
http://espn.go.com/mens-college-basketball/tournament/history/_/team1/7721.  
284 “NCAA Basketball Tournament History: Arizona Wildcats,” ESPN, accessed August 24, 2015, 
http://espn.go.com/mens-college-basketball/tournament/history/_/team1/5229. 
285 Danaher, 1997 NCAA Championship Game after Action Report.  
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although other areas presented a concern and required policing.286 The 4th Avenue bar 
district hosts a cluster of bars that primarily attract students (see Figure 8).  
Figure 8.  4th Avenue Area near the University of Arizona 
 
Image generated from Apple Maps program. 
The area has bars on both sides of the street, and there is a streetcar running through the 
entire district. This presented safety challenges for the police when preparing for the 1997 
and 2001 championship games.287  
In 2014 and 2015, a surge in businesses in the Main Street Square business 
district, as well as new student housing, changed the focal point of the celebratory 
                                                 
286 Deposition of Robinson, Bouley, Schlesinger, and Schippers (State of Arizona Superior Court 
2003). Robinson spoke of being concern about several college bars surrounding the University of Arizona. 
Jeffrey Knepper vs. the City of Tucson No. 22001 5008 (2003).  
287 Danaher, 1997 NCAA Championship Game after Action Report.  
 73 
activity. Similar to the 4th Avenue area, Main Street Square is surrounded by bars on both 
sides, and it has the new Modern Street Car running through the middle. This area is 
significantly closer to the university, making it more accessible to students. There is also 
a residential neighborhood to the west (see Figure 9).  
Figure 9.  Main Street Square near the University of Arizona 
 
Image generated from Apple Maps program. 
1. Conditions  
Three common variables discussed in Chapter III, centralization, game 
importance, and game intensity, were present during each year studied. Centralization is a 
physical condition, and will be discussed throughout the rest of the chapter. Game 
importance rests on the finality of the game and the expectations of the fans. For 
example, in 1997, Arizona was viewed as an underdog throughout much of the 
tournament.288 Following each subsequent victory, the expectations for Arizona to 
achieve a national championship increased.289 Fans told reporters of their difficulties 
                                                 
288 Tim Kawakami, “Underdog Role Nothing New to Optimistic Young Wildcats,” Los Angeles 
Times, March 29, 1997.  
289 Javier Morales, “It’s All Wildcats: Win Gets UA to Seasons’ Ultimate Goal,” Arizona Daily Star, 
March 30, 1997.  
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getting to this point, of their struggles, and of how “everyone underestimated us.”290 A 
newspaper article the morning after the championship game captured the intensity of the 
game when a student said, “I’ve never felt like I had 30,000 family members, but last 
night on Fourth Avenue it was like one big family party. I’ve never given more high-fives 
and hugs to people that I have never met.”291 The intensity of the game itself added to 
this energy. With the 1997 championship game tied at half time, the energy of the crowd 
had already built to a feverish pitch; fans throwing ice buckets at each other to celebrate 
the comeback.292 As the game concluded, “fans threw chairs and sprayed each other with 
beer as the overtime period ended and the Wildcats’ victory was made official.”293  
In 2001, Arizona was no longer an underdog, but some still questioned whether it 
could win against more accomplished basketball programs, such as Michigan State.294 
The intensity increased during the championship game against favored Duke, when 
frustrated fans blamed referees and television personalities announcing the game of 
having “east coast bias.”295 The 2014 Elite Eight quarterfinal game ended in a one-point 
overtime loss to Wisconsin, with teams changing leads throughout the contest.296 The 
2015 rematch between Wisconsin and Arizona had the making of a very intense game; 
however, Wisconsin built and held a 10-point lead through much of the second half.297 
                                                 
290 Danaher, 1997 NCAA Championship Game after Action Report.  
291 Craig Degel, “Anyone Not on 4th Ave. Last Night?” Arizona Daily Wildcat, April 1, 1997. This 
article was included in the Tucson Police Department 1997 after action report to highlight the media 
attention.  
292 Lima, Brown, and Hernandez, “Loud, Naked, Drunken Fans Storm Tucson.”  
293 Ibid.  
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2. Normalization  
A previously discussed in Chapter III, social norming is a standardizing of 
behavior within a group.298 Prior to the 1997 championship game, Arizona had never 
experienced a sports riot; however, immediately following the game, thousands of 
students left the bar district on 4th Avenue and entered the streets to celebrate.299 This 
section discusses how social norming impacted the all five case studies at the University 
of Arizona.   
a. 1997 and 2001 
By 1997, riots following sporting event occurred with some regularity on a global 
level, including incidents in the United States. Hooliganism in the United Kingdom was 
gaining media attention following a series of violent clashes. Meanwhile, Game 5 of the 
1984 World Series between the Detroit Tigers and the San Diego Padres grabbed national 
attention when the Tigers won their first championship in 16 years.300 The celebration 
turned violent when fans set fires, flipped cars, and looted businesses. The 1997 AAR 
mentions the how surprised the police were when the riot occurred.301 In addition, it also 
discusses the importance of monitoring activities around the county for behaviors 
following events, such as a two-night riot in Boulder, Colorado over enforcement of 
liquor laws, a riot in Providence following an NCAA basketball game, a confrontation 
with the Klu Klux Klan (KKK) in Ohio, and an animal rights disturbance in Atlanta.302 
While these events differ from sports riots, they highlight how large events may spin into 
violent clashes between attendees and the police.   
In 1997, social media was not as prevalent as today, and although available, 
cellular technology had still not hit the mass market.303 Mainstream media, however, had 
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“a major impact on the event”304 Local media allotted significant airtime to the Final 
Four, including commentary, player analysis, fan analysis, and eventually coverage of the 
game itself.305 While the 1997 AAR focuses mainly on strategy and tactics affecting the 
police, it also includes a number of newspaper articles that captured key points 
demonstrating that the students’ excitability was higher than the police may have 
anticipated.306 Once article quotes then Assistant Chief Richard Miranda as saying, “We 
never though it would be this unruly.”307 While the same article quotes a student saying, 
“Everyone is going pretty ape shit! This is the way it’s supposed to be. I’d expect nothing 
less. Breaking lights, tipping over cars—I’d expect no less.”308 An editorial applauds the 
student’s ability to celebrate, saying:  
A few people sustained minor injuries, an unmarked police car was 
destroyed, and a big mess was made. That is unfortunate and inexcusable. 
But it’s tame stuff compared with the violent scenes major cities have 
endured when their sports teams won big.309  
Other articles, published prior to the championship, showed that fan excitement 
extended from the average student fan310 all the way to the to the Arizona governor’s 
office.311 With fans describing the basketball fever as “greatest thing that’s ever 
happened to the University of Arizona” and “orgasmic,”312 the Arizona Daily Star felt 
compelled to print an article offering students and fans advice about how to cope with 
“superfan fanaticism.”313 
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The 2001 NCAA Men’s Basketball National Championship between the 
University of Arizona and Duke University was less of a surprise to the Tucson police; 
they had more time to prepare than they did in 1997.314 The early predication was that 
the 4th Avenue bar district would be the active area once again, similar to how it was in 
1997. It was only four years since the 1997 riots, so members of the freshmen class could 
still be at school (possibly seniors) for the 2001 tournament.  
The media coverage in 2001 was similar to 1997, with the exceptions of articles 
printing memories of the 1997 riots.315 The pre-game environment was that of disrespect, 
highlighted by several newspaper articles. The fans also responded by purchasing large 
amounts of Arizona Wildcat fanfare in support of the team.316 The night of the 
championship game, as the students moved into the 4th Avenue area, some had 
celebratory attitudes as indicated by high-fiving and taking photographs with the police. 
Other students were confrontational and challenging to the officers.317 
b. 2014 and 2015  
By 2014, the ability for people to communicate transformed from mainstream 
media to social media, although the media continued to play an important role in 
reminding students about the 1997 and 2001 riots. An article in the Arizona Daily 
Wildcat, titled, “Police Prepare for Possible Riots over NCAA Championships,” gave 
students an explanation of the riotous history at Arizona, and included a photograph that 
offered more a celebratory feel (see Figure 10).318  
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Figure 10.  Celebration or Rioting? 
 
Source: Plotkin, “Police Prepare for Possible Riots over NCAA Championships.” 
An expectation of victory in 2014,319 coupled with stories about heavy police presence 
on the night of the games,320 established the tone for the students.  
Prior to the 2014 Final Four, the Tucson Police Department partnered the 
University of Arizona, Department of Athletics and the University of Arizona Police 
Department to create a public service announcement asking for students to “Bear Down 
with Pride.”321 It was released on March 28, 2014. Arizona won the Sweet Sixteen game 
on March 27, and lost the Elite Eight game on March 29. Both games ended with clashes 
between students and the police in the Main Street Square area.322  
The University of Florida celebrated victories through the Final Four semifinals 
leading up to the lost to Connecticut. Following that championship game, Connecticut 
had a small celebratory disturbance near campus, while Florida did not. It is also noted 
that the University of Florida has never experienced a sports event riot.323 Part of this 
reason has been attributed to the culture that the University of Florida has established 
over the years. The Gainesville Police Department allows the students to celebrate in the 
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street, but the messaging has always been about celebrating positively. This includes a 
campaign of “hugs and high fives,” where it is not uncommon for the police to lead 
school chants.324 In 2015, the University of Arizona repeated its “Bear Down with Pride” 
campaigned used in 2014, but this time the police handed out rubber wrist bands with this 
phrase to the students prior, during, and follow the game.325 This tactic gave the 
opportunity for the police and students to interact positively throughout the game. It must 
be noted that although Arizona lost in the Elite Eight game to Wisconsin (similarly to 
2014), and there were no reported incidents following the game.326  
3. Social Identity  
As discussed in Chapter III, social identity occurs when an individual believes she 
or he has membership into the same social category, in this case, a group.327 In a sports 
riot, this process also begins prior to the game but strengthens throughout the sporting 
event. The evidence can be seen with simple fan support.  
a. Social Categorization: 1997 and 2001 
Tajfel and Turner describe this as social categorization, where people quickly 
assess and categorize others.328 Although social categorization has been occurring 
throughout the group interaction, it becomes very clear following the game. In 1997, the 
support of the Arizona Wildcats extended far beyond the students. The community rallied 
behind the team for each game—to the point of delirium.329 Following the semi-final 
victory, one fan told a reporter, “I have been waiting for this all my life. I live and die by 
the Wildcats. I’m so happy, I’m ready to go to the emergency room.”330 Wildcat fever 
turned into marketing, with merchandising spreading across the town to increase school 
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spirit.331 While on a national level, sports analysis predicting that Arizona would lose 
against Kentucky increased tensions between schools and increased the game 
intensity.332 
The day of the game began early as fans that could not make the trip to the Final 
Four find a place to watch the game on television. In 1997 and 2001, the 4th Avenue bar 
district was the place to be for University of Arizona fans. Known for the vast number of 
sports bars and the close proximity to campus, area businesses heavily promoted the 
basketball championship. The 1997 Tucson Police Department AAR documented 
thousands of fans in the 4th Avenue area during and following the game.333 Each fan 
wore school colors and cheered for his/her team as the game commenced. One student 
told a reporter, “I’ve never seen so much school spirit in my life. This makes all the hard 
years at school worth it.”334 As discussed in Chapter III, game importance and fans 
centralizing are two factors needed to increase the social identity of the fans.  
The data collected from the 2001 game paints a better picture of how the crowd in 
the bars began developing group cohesion. At the start of the game, most students were 
inside of the bar watching, with a few smaller groups outside due to the bars being at 
capacity.335 The mood of the crowd was mostly celebratory prior to the game; however, 
there was a clear police presence, as opposed to 1997. Video evidence presented to the 
2001 board of inquiry shows a majority of the students in and around the bars wearing 
school colors (blue and red) and in a positive, celebratory mood.336 The video also 
showed that the crowds were small groups of people walking together or standing in lines 
waiting to enter the bars.337 As the game begins, the cheering on the video is positive and 
supportive of the school.338 Chants of “U of A” can be heard on the tape, as well as 
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cheering and clapping.339 The board of inquiry notes that very few problems occurred 
during the game itself, other than a few minor isolated fights.340 However, at the 
beginning of the game, officers were lined up across the street, but allowed people to pass 
through. Although the officers were not wearing tactical equipment (helmets and face 
masks), “the line immediately attracted the attention of people, some of whom feigned 
charges on the officers and challenged them verbally.”341 One student told a reporter, “I 
think what really started freaking out the kids was seeing all the police lined up and down 
the road.”342 Others people took the time to chat with the officers and take photographs 
with them as a novelty.343  
In 1997, upon the conclusion of the game, the students poured out of the bars and 
into the streets. The smaller crowds joined with the younger students and other fans to 
make a very large crowd estimated to be in the thousands by some media sources.344 The 
Tucson Police Department’s AAR estimated the “rowdy crowds” to be about 150–200.345 
The media played a significant part in the building of crowd energy, and it was identified 
in the AAR as drawing students to the area, as well as drawing students to the lights of 
the cameras.346 The crowds reacted similarly following the conclusion of the 2001 
championship game.  
Although the police were significantly better prepared in 2001, large numbers of 
student quickly overwhelmed the officers. The 2001 after action report estimated the total 
number of students to be about 2,500 in the 4th Avenue bar district, compared to 400 
police officers in riot gear.347 However, it was clear on the video that students were 
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coming into the area on bikes from surrounding neighborhoods,348 so not all fans in the 
streets from the bars. This area later became the “focal point of the crowd’s escalation 
and the genesis of the riotous activity.”349 Of the conditions discussed in Chapter III, 
centralization of the students occurred in 1997 and the 2001 championship games, 
although the outcome of the games were significantly different.  
b. Social Categorization: 2014 and 2015 
The circumstances in 2014 and 2015 in Tucson were similar to that of previous 
year, including large number of fans filling the bar districts and overflowing onto the 
sidewalks.350 In 2014, the students changed locations where they watched the game from 
the 4th Avenue area to the Main Street Square. The interaction with police was also 
significantly different. In 2014 and 2015, strategy of the Tucson Police Department was 
to have officers in groups of “2 to 4…mingle with the crowd and provide positive police 
interaction.”351 However, immediately following the Sweet Sixteen victory, the students 
exited the bars and centralized in the middle of the street.352 This was the first time that 
student centralized following a Sweet Sixteen game at Arizona. For the Elite Eight game, 
Tucson Police deployed 140 officers to the Main Street Square area to deter unlawful 
behavior.353 Although the presence was obvious, it did not deter the students from 
centralizing in the street after the game.354  
Cameras on police officers’ helmets captured the crowd behavior immediately 
following the conclusion of the Elite Eight loss to Wisconsin. The students appeared to 
be dressed in similar apparel as previous years (shirts and shorts showing support for the 
team).355 Initially, the video shows a small group of students centralizing in the middle of 
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the street and near the Modern Streetcar station, while a larger crowd milled around the 
area in small groups.356 The environment at first appeared friendly, with people taking 
photos and videos, and posing with the officers. There was a clear separation of space 
however between the officer and the students. As the crowd grew in size, the officers 
stayed near buildings and away from the epicenter of the group in the street.357 
c. Social Identification: 1997 and 2001  
The 2001 championship provides an excellent example of social identification.358 
While in the middle of the intersection, the crowd began chanting “U of A,” which later 
turned into “Fuck Duke” (the opposing team). With the process of social identification, 
the crowd of fan began to unite as it is developing its identity. As discussed in Chapter 
III, the group tendency is to inflate its own importance while diminishing the value of the 
opposing group.359 At this point, the opposing team signifies the out-group.  
Following the initial chanting, the students were seen on video milling in the 
street. During this time, the students were talking to each other, high-fiving, and chanting 
in smaller groups. Many students are simply standing in the street alone, watching 
others.360 Shouldering361 and climbing occurred in 2001 as the group began to grow in 
size.362 Immediately following the initial centralization, climbing and shouldering appear 
to be done to gain a height advantage.363 
                                                 
356 Ibid., video “FLEX.X78002657.0225.140329.204202.1803.”  
357 Ibid., video “BWC49 Fisher (6:29)” 
358 Tajfel, Social Identity and Intergroup Relations, 16.  
359 Ibid., 34.  
360 Miranda, 2001 NCAA Championship Deployment, video evidence: Schur, 8:30.  
361 When a person, usually a female, gets on the shoulders of another.  
362 Miranda, 2001 NCAA Championship Deployment, 15.  
363 Ibid., video evidence: Schur, 8:48.  
 84 
d. Social Identification: 2014 and 2015 
The 2014 University of Arizona riot showed a similar milling period immediately 
following the initial centralizing of the students.364 The board of inquiry (BOI) noted that 
many of the patrons left the area soon after the game but about a thousand remained.365 
Video evidence shows how many students milling while watching another group of 
students defiantly facing police.366 Unlike the 2001 BOI, which provided a play-by-play 
of events, the 2014 BOI did not discuss the dynamics of the crowd other than identifying 
various behavioral traits (e.g., throwing of objects and lighting of fireworks). Helmet 
camera video captured this moment. The fireworks appeared to have come from the 
center of the street and drew the attention of many students who were milling on the 
peripheral.367 In response, the police activated sirens and moved the police motorcycles 
closer to the students in the street. The sound attracted more students, who could be seen 
running from off-camera into the center of the street.368 The students in the streets were 
the first of the more obvious honor challenges and attracted a modest number of students 
into the middle. The firework exploding in the middle of the group was the next obvious 
challenge. However, the police response (sirens) seemed to have increased the energy of 
the crowd and size of the group in the street.  
The 2015 after action report did not discuss any crowd behaviors and instead only 
focused on tactical and operational considerations for the police. In addition, there were 
media reports about the strategy changing in 2015 over previous years where the police 
engaged the crowd in a “friendlier” manner.369 The after action report noted that there 
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were “no significant incidents” following the 2015 event. The differences between 2014 
and 2015 are discussed further in Chapter IV.  
e. Social Comparison: 1997 and 2001
The honor/challenging phase ends the milling by giving the group positive 
distinction.370 Generally, the first challenge comes by the group of students entering and 
taking control over the street. As the growing crowds overwhelm the police, anonymity 
increases and individuals become empowered to continue these challenges. In 2001, the 
first firework was seen in the crowd during the milling period.371 The energy grew as 
more people from outside the area walked into the group, which within the next 30 
minutes grew to over 1,000 people.372 These challenges lead to the groups circularing 
around the activity. Figure 11 shows students circularing around a mosh pit follow the 
2001 championship game.  
Figure 11.  Students Circularing around a Mosh Pit 
Source: Miranda, 2001 NCAA Championship Deployment, video evidence, Schur. 
370 Hogg, “A Social Identity Theory of Leadership,” 200. 
371 Miranda, 2001 NCAA Championship Deployment, 14. 
372 Ibid.  
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In both 1997 and 2001, the crowds continued to grow and increase energy as the 
police moved away from the epicenter for safety. As a result, the police may not have 
been able to see much of the activity in the epicenter.373 The report by Miranda noted, in 
the 2001 incident, the first mosh pit develop near the center of the crowd; however, the 
police were not nearby, and they may not have noticed it developing.374 According to 
video evidence, the first of several fights broke out due to the mosh pit activity, although 
the police remained unaware. Also noted the Miranda report, this group was “agitating” 
the crowd and that people were “feeding off” the activity.375 In a build up to a potential 
riot, this condition of anonymity allows activity to continue unchallenged by police.  
At this point in 2001 after the game in Tucson, people began entering the crowd 
wear ski masks covering their faces, presumably for anonymity.376 Shortly later, people 
began climbing light poles and small fights broke out.377 The first “incident exposure” 
occurred around this same time, and the mosh pit activity “picked up markedly.”378 
When the police attempted to intervene, the crowd turned aggressive toward them.379 
Each individual trait can be considered a honor challenge against the police, who are now 
seen as the out-group. The pattern that begins to take form starts slowly but quickly 
escalates as the crowd grows and the group builds cohesion. Once challenges stop, the 
crowd enters the milling phase again. For example, in 2001, police reported that the 
crowd was settling down, but this quickly reversed when people began rocking street 
signs.380 
In 2001, the police recognized that the group of students “turned nasty,” and the 
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police,” and several officer reported having liquid thrown at them.382 Although the police 
remained on the outskirts of the group, the “size and action of the crowd prevented most 
people from noting any police presence.”383 Within an hour and a half of the game 
ending, the first bar (O’Malley’s) reported that there was a “huge riot outside, [and] 
they’re trying to break all the windows to the business.”384 The next 30 minutes 
witnessed a series of escalating behavior that included setting fires in the middle of the 
road, flipping cars and burning cars, and eventually the arson of an occupied business. As 
this behavior occurred, the helicopter observer noticed that “approximately half” of the 
group rapidly fled the area at this time, leaving only the core group of rioters.385 As the 
skirmish line of police moved in to clear the area, informal leaders surfaced by sitting in 
the middle of the street to block the officers’ attempts to get to the fires burning 
nearby.386 As the skirmish line advanced, the core group of about 200 people began 
throwing rocks at the officers, with shouts of encouragement heard from within the 
crowd.387 The social comparison phase is a constant reevaluation to determine positive 
identity.388 The cause of the group splitting was many individuals lost value in what the 
main group now represented. 
f. Social Comparison: 2014 and 2015 
In 2014, following the University of Arizona’s Elite Eight loss to Wisconsin, 
video shows large portions of milling students energized following the firework 
explosion and the police activating sirens.389 As this group grows in size, the video also 
shows the police move motorcycles up to face the group and other officers in riot gear390 
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lining up in a skirmish line.391 Figure 12 shows an overhead view of the positioning of 
the police.  
Figure 12.  Police and Students Face Off Prior to Rioting 
 
Source: “Upset Fans Take to the Streets, Police Fight Back with Force,” KGUN, accessed 
August 26, 2015, http://www.scrippsmedia.com/kgun9/news/Upset-fans-take-to-the-
streets-police-fight-back-253082761.html. 
In response, the several members of the group stood between the main part of the 
group and the motorcycle officers waving their arms upward in encouragement to the 
group and taunting the officers.392 This is another honor challenge by the in-group (of 
students). Even at the point where the officers are about to engage the students, other 
students watch nearby, indecisive about whether to leave or to stay, despite repeated 
orders to leave the area by police. When the police ordered the crowd to disperse, few 
people left the area (another honor challenge).393  
With each challenge, the group seemed become increasingly confident about 
overtly challenging the police.394 Even when the police deploy pepperballs395 at the 
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individuals, some endure it out of defiance. Figure 13 shows a student being hit several 
times before being arrested by police. 
Figure 13.  Student Challenges Police during 2014 Arizona Riot 
Source: WorldWide TV, “Arizona Students in NCAA Basketball Loss Riot,” YouTube 
video, accessed August 26, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VD-sv3giCt8.  
As the group maintained its defiance against police, members of the crowd began 
chanting, “Fuck the police,” sparking more objects to be thrown from the back of the 
crowd, where the large mass of anonymous students prevailed.396 In 2014, the types of 
challenges by the students differed from 1997 and 2001. For instance, in 2014, the board 
of inquiry reported fireworks and some climbing, but the majority of the activity reported 
was objects being thrown at officers.397 Additionally, the 2014 riot lacked fires, flashing, 
and mosh pits, as seen in previous riots in Tucson.398  
In 2015, the students centralized in the streets following the Elite Eight loss to 
Wisconsin, as they had in previous years. However, this year the police remained in close 
contact with the students. Although there were two arrests, neither was related to the 
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celebration.399 Although there is a lack of data to explain why the 2015 event ended 
peacefully while other events turned violent, the strategy of having officers remain in 
close proximity to the crowd may have prevented the smaller groups from joining into a 
larger group.  
Chapter V provides overall analysis of the different events to highlight patterns 
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V. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
An effective security organization is a dynamic entity that is always 
organizing, and never fully organized. 
— Karl Weick, The Social Psychology of Organizing 
 
The initial analysis of the data of the four incidents at the University of Arizona 
sought to establish whether there are behavioral patterns with the students and the police, 
or in any combination. The analysis first identifies common behaviors seen at the four 
different case studies between 1997 and 2015. Next, it examines the different conditions 
identified in Chapter III to determine if these conditions were present during any of the 
games. Finally, documentation for each game is examined to determine if traits 
associated with normalization and the social identity theory are present.  
The next few sections describe a process of normalization and social identity of a 
sport crowd as it turns from individuals into a collective group. Figure 14 provides visual 
support of this process by showing how the more common traits and conditions relate. 




A. CONDITIONS  
Initial examination shows several conditions present at each of the events that 
could affect the final outcome. First, the locations where the students accumulate seems 
to focus around the popular bar districts close to student housing. These locations were 
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accurately predicted by the police prior to each game, although the locations changed 
between years 2001 and 2014. Although centralization also provides the social 
environment for watching these events, it also appears to be a necessary component for a 
riot to occur. In the 2001 board of inquiry for the University of Arizona riot documented 
that immediately following the conclusion of the game,  
Approximately 300 people had gathered on 4th Avenue in front of 
O’Malleys [in the street]. A smaller group of about 50 had gathered in the 
intersection of 4th Avenue and 8th Street, which was later to become the 
focal point of the crowd’s escalation and the genesis of the riotous 
activity.400  
In every case study, centralization occurred, and this provided a venue for the 
celebration. Second, in all four case studies, the bars were at capacity with people 
overflowing out front. Large numbers of celebrators provide the environments for 
anonymity and empowerment. Third, uniformed police were present before, during, and 
following the games in all four case studies. Fourth, all four incidents included mostly 
male students in their early 20s and the heavy use of alcohol. However, as indicated in 
the 2001 board of inquiry,401 not all rioters were students, and not all people drinking 
alcohol rioted. The Tucson Police Department 2001 Board notes this, stating that it would 
be “a mistake to assume that only University students were so engaged, since this event 
[basketball championship] was of interest to a far wider audience in Tucson.”402 
Considering that a large number of studies about these events identify alcohol as a factor, 
it cannot be dismissed; however, the data for this study did not provide enough details 
about the use of alcohol to give any further support than already in existence.  
The same conclusion should be noted for age and gender of the participants. 
Although the video evidence in the boards of inquiries from 2001 and 2014 state that a 
majority of the participants were young (20s) men,403 it is difficult to identify a median 
age without a larger sample of actual data. Also, there were a number of women in the 
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crowd intermingled with the men in all four cases. Therefore, while none of these 
observations allow for concrete conclusions about age and gender as a causal factor for 
riots, both can be construed as commonalities among these case studies. Due to this lack 
of data, it is impossible to determine conclusively what impact age and gender has on 
these events; however, there does appear to be a consistent pattern based on the video 
evidence.  
Other conditions identified in Chapter III were game intensity and game 
importance. The importance of the game varies depending on the finality (season ending) 
and rivalries. However, the details of the case studies lack the data to show the impact of 
game importance, other than every game played in the NCAA tournament carries 
significant importance. In the NCAA men’s basketball tournament, a loss ends the season 
for that team. This fact magnified the importance of each game as the team continues to 
win. In 1997, the newspaper articles before and following the game captured the 
importance of each game, but especially the final three games, where Arizona beat three 
number one ranked teams to win the championship.404 Rivalry games carry an 
importance without the finality. For example, the 2001 championship game between 
Arizona and Duke had the feel of a rivalry game; Duke was the favorite and had an 
already proven basketball dynasty with two national championships in six to the finals 
prior to this game.405 The 2014 and 2015 games were equally as important in terms of 
finality to Arizona, as it faced (and lost to) Wisconsin in the Elite Eight of both years. 
Nonetheless, 2014 ended with a sports riot while 2015 did not. There were several 
differences between these two years, one of which was the intensity of the game. Table 6 
compares the different games to show the previous conditions impact the potential of a 
riot.  
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of Group  
1997 Yes Yes Yes 
2001 Yes Yes Yes 
2014 Yes Yes Yes 
2015 No Yes Yes 
 
 
Game intensity is described as the energy and excitement of the game.406 When 
examining the four University of Arizona men’s basketball games (1997, 2001, 2014, and 
2015), each game that ended in a sports riot (1997, 2001, and 2014) concluded as a 
highly competitive game that was decided in the last minute.407 The 1997 championship 
game and 2014 Elite Eight both were closely fought contests that extended into 
overtime.408 The 2001 championship game was a three-point difference within the final 
two minutes of the contest.409 However, in 2015, the Arizona/Wisconsin rematch from 
the previous year, ended with Wisconsin having a comfortable lead throughout much of 
the second half.410 Neither school rioted in 2015.411 There is far too little actual data to 
support this hypothesis fully; however, it remains a reasonable factor in the overall 
condition.  
                                                 
406 Described in Chapter III.  
407 In 1997 Arizona (84) vs Kentucky (79) beat three #1 seeds to and won in overtime; 2001 Arizona 
(72) vs Duke (82) beat two #1 seeds to lose in Championship; 2014 Arizona (63) vs. Wisconsin (64) lost in 
overtime. In 1997, Arizona beat three number seeds to reach the Championship, where it won 84–79 over 
Kentucky in overtime. In 2001, Arizona beat two number-one seeds to reach the final, where they lost to 
Duke 72–82. And in 2014, Arizona lost to Wisconsin 64–63 in overtime.  
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B. NORMALIZATION  
The impacts of social norming were evident in 1997 when Arizona experienced 
its first sports riot. Although students had celebrated games in the past, these celebrations 
had not turned into full riots. Media influence has been shown to be a powerful norming 
agent. Each story brings the fans closer to the team and makes them part of the team. As 
the event approaches, the excitement builds. There was very little information contained 
in the case studies themselves that identify social norming as a contributing factor to 
sports riots; however, news articles following the 1997 riots offered compelling links. 
Prior to 1997, the University of Arizona had never witnessed a sports riot first hand, yet 
the Arizona Daily Wildcat412 published an article following the championships game 
where a student was quoted as saying, “This is the way it’s supposed to be. I’d expect 
nothing less. Breaking lights, tipping over cars—I’d expect no less.”413 The norm had 
been evolving through the media as other cities erupted in violence following their 
championships.  
In an attempt to identify the potential danger, the 1997 after action report makes 
comparisons to other types of events around the country that resulted in violence; 
however, police assume that that sporting events have similarities to late night parties, 
political rallies, and animal rights demonstrations.414 Although each of these events may 
have resulted in a riot, the crowds at each of these events are significantly different, 
making it difficult to compare these incidents to a sports riot. The Ohio State University 
Task Force on Preventing Celebratory riots identifies a similar error in its report, when it 
noted that most campus riots in the last two decades were “celebratory in nature.”415 
Recognizing this, the Tucson Police Department and University of Arizona began a 
public service announcement through the media and social media prior to the 2014 
tournament to teach fans proper behavior following a sporting event.416 The “Bear Down 
                                                 
412 The University of Arizona student-run newspaper. 
413 Altman, Jr. and Lima, “Post-Game Madness Overwhelms Police.”  
414 Danaher, 1997 NCAA Championship Game after Action Report.  
415 Task Force on Preventing Celebratory Riots, The Ohio State University, 20.  
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with Pride” campaign aimed to teach students that it was acceptable to celebrate but with 
limitations. In years past, the students only rioted following the championship game, 
which gave the police time to get the messaging to the students. However, when the team 
lost in the Elite Eight game, the program had just been launched and was ineffective. 
Following the 2014 riot at the University of Arizona, the board of inquiry found that 
“social media was used by participants to share pictures and comments about the 
unfolding events, and this seemed to draw additional persons into the area.”417 The report 
also notes positives in social media use, specifically relating to the cleanup efforts,418 and 
how utilizing social media may be used to encourage positive behavior [by the 
students].419 The 2014 board of inquiry also states, “Social media has a significant 
impact on operations involving large crowds.” Although the board falls short of 
qualifying that statement, it recommends the use of social media in future 
preparations.420 In 2015, the program was launched earlier in the tournament using 
television and social media as the platforms. Wristbands with the engraved phrase (Bear 
Down with Pride) were given to police officers to hand to students, providing opportunity 
for the police and the students to have personal conversations to enforce the message. 
The evidence lacks the necessary detail to show conclusively social norming is a 
causal factor for sports riots. Even so, there are several behavioral traits common to each 
event that are also common in other sports around the world. For example, centralizing 
the streets shares characteristics with pitch invasions, where fans rush the field following 
a dramatic finish to a game.421 Also, the messaging campaign between 2014 and 2015 
provides strong evidence that positive messaging does influence behavior, considering 
that the conditions between these two years were fairly similar. Nevertheless, other 
factors may also have added to the outcome, such as the time of the game (daytime 
versus nighttime) and the intensity of the game. Based on these case studies alone, the 
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link between norming and the development of a sports riot remains a partially supported 
hypothesis.  
C. SOCIAL IDENTITY  
Creating a link between social identity and how a crowd develops into a group 
during a sporting event has proven challenging due to the limited information that 
specifically relates to this social behavior. Police after action reports (AAR) and board of 
inquiry (BOI) investigations used in this study focus mainly on police tactics and 
strategies. The newspaper articles from 1997 offer some evidence as to how groups bond, 
even without obvious reasons. After the University of Arizona 1997 championship game, 
in an article titled, “Anyone Not on 4th Ave. Last Night?,” the author commented, “I’ve 
never felt like I had 30,000 family members, but last night on Fourth Avenue it was like 
one big family party. I’ve never given more high-fives and hugs to people that I have 
never met.”422 The data provided by the 2001 BOI gave the best account of how the 
crowd developed, including a timelines of events. The video evidence used in the BOI 
provided a visual account; however, the video was not marked in a way to compare it to 
the BOI report. The 2014 BOI also used video evidence; however, the details in the 
narrative did not provide the same level detail about the crowd as 2001. The video in both 
cases provided excellent detail of how the crowd split into a centralized group in the 
middle of the street, and how this group reacted to the police. Details leading up to this 
point were less obvious unfortunately.  
The beginnings of social identity are obvious in all four events, as evidenced by 
similar behavior in each. The informal membership begins with the fans coming to a 
centralized location (bar district), wearing common colors, and showing spirit for their 
team through common celebratory behaviors. As the intensity of each game increases, the 
crowd energy increases. This behavior was captured in newspaper clips from the 1997 
event when it described some fan’s extreme emotions and over-exaggerated levels of 
excitement.423 This was also seen in the 2001 BOI evidence videotape when chants of “U 
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of A” could be heard.424 As the game continued, students began giving high-fives to 
strangers and the chants turn negative toward the opposing team. At the end of the game 
in each event, the students exited the bars and met in the middle of the street to celebrate.  
Again, this celebration was well documented in 2001 and 2014 with students 
cheering and chanting together. In both situations, the students also turned this into 
derogatory chants against the opposing team. At this point, there appears to be evidence 
of an in-group (students) and an out-group (opposing team). Additionally, the presence of 
the police also provides a potential out-group, as evident by individuals challenging 
officers prior to the start of the game. For example, the board of inquiry for the 2014 riots 
at the University of Arizona described how the police standing nearby in helmets and 
face shields, and the use of police motorcycles with lights and sirens “appeared to agitate 
the crowd” of over 1000 students.425  
The 2001 and 2014 BOIs also document periods of milling behaviors, where there 
is a lull in the activity and the students can be seen in smaller groups talking among 
themselves and watching other smaller groups or the main group in the middle of the 
street. Video of the 2001 University of Arizona sports riot showed large periods of 
milling, as small groups converged shortly after the game ended.426 Police reported that 
the crowd was “settling down” due to a lack of action.427 Following the 2015 University 
of Arizona Elite 8 loss to Wisconsin, students centralized in the middle of the street 
following the game. After a period of chanting, the tone quieted as students walked 
around, asking each other if they thought a riot would occur this year as it had in previous 
years.428 When a group fails to retain positive distinction, it weakens the group social 
identity, as it did in 2015. Even so, this behavior may continue until individuals within 
the main group present the first honor challenge.  
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Honor challenges came in various behavioral traits but follow a pattern within 
each year. The 1997 AAR described students committing vandalism, projectiles thrown 
at officers, cars flipped, and fires set. Unfortunately, in 1997, the police were surprised of 
the escalation and did not appear to capture data as the students first centralized in the 
streets. The evidence related to the 2001 riot offered a much better description, since the 
officers were there for the entire time and witnessed the events. In 2001, students began 
with fireworks and mosh pit dancing, progressed to shouldering and flashing, and ended 
with vandalism, throwing projectiles at officers, flipping cars, and setting fires. A more 
obvious example occurred when a group of University of Arizona students sat in the 
middle of the street blocking the officers’ attempts to get to the fires burning nearby.429 
In 2014, the students again began with fireworks, but the police quickly organized, 
possibly eliminating the next few stages of challenges. Once confronted by the police, the 
students quickly escalated to committing vandalism and throwing projectiles at officers. 
As the police moved in to clear the streets, in the 1997, 2001, and 2014 incidents, there 
were also shared reports of individuals stepping in front of the rest of the group to 
passively challenge officers in what appeared to be an effort to excite the group. The 
escalation of the group in each case followed a similar pattern—with the exception of 
2015. With each challenge to the officers, the center of the group united, as evidenced by 
cheers and taunting.  
Through the process of stereotyping crowds, generally from prior knowledge, 
where police make the assumptions that crowds are groups and groups are dangerous.430 
As a result, police officers react per their training and treat these groups as threats. 
Tactical training is based on worst-case scenarios, and sets the precedent for officers to 
always be prepared for any threat. For example, although only a fraction of traffic stops 
results in violence against the officer, officers are trained to treat every driver as a threat 
until the contact ends. To police officers, crowds represent a potential threat, since its 
unpredictability may quickly turn into an overwhelming situation. This is evident when 
examining policing behavior at large events. Video taken by police during the 2001 riots 
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showed police officers mingling within the crowd up until the end of the game. As the 
crowd energized in the streets, the police began to move toward the surrounding 
sidewalks. Eventually, the video showed the police officers lined up in groups with their 
backs against the building walls.431 There were no lesson plans in the academy training 
the officers to move from the center of the crowd. Simple officer safety principles guided 
them into this action to prevent someone from approaching their blindside; however, the 
tactic itself results in a separation of the police from the crowd and ultimately increases 
anonymity of the individuals within the group.  
The videos from the various BOIs show how students launched projectiles at the 
officers from behind of the group, using anonymity as a shield. It also explained how 
mosh pits and fights occurred in the middle of the central group, away from the view of 
the police. Anonymity might not carry the literal meeting of “made or done by someone 
unknown,”432 since it has been established that people tend to remain in smaller groups 
within the larger group.433 Furthermore, the tendency for students to climb on shoulders, 
poles, and lights places them in full view of the group and the police. This suggests that 
anonymity in this situation may imply a lower probability of being arrested.  
D. POLICE UNDER-REACTION/OVER-REACTION 
(CHALLENGE/RESPONSE CYCLE)  
The reaction of the police in each incident affected the group’s behavior. In 1997, 
a lack of police response contributed to the escalation of the crowd and provided the 
conditions that allowed the group to become more cohesive.434 In 2001, the separation of 
the police to the outsides of the central group enhanced the conditions of anonymity 
within the group and allowed challenges to continue and escalate without an appropriate 
response.435 At one point in 2001, the police left the area to prepare for a skirmish line. 
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The 2001 BOI blamed this action for increasing the volatility of the crowd by delaying 
the police response.436 A complete absence of police also led to a lack of appropriate 
response to challenges, thus increasing the group identity.  
In 2014, the police were admittedly unprepared for a riot following the Elite Eight 
loss. The police moved into a skirmish line but did not advance toward the group, causing 
the appearance of a group versus group standoff in the middle of the street. As previously 
established, threat of an out-group increased the cohesion of the in-group.437 Police over-
reaction has a similar impact on the group, although the data in these case studies did not 
show crowd reaction; possibly because group cohesion dissipates when faced with a 
stronger group.438 The community reaction following the 2001 and 2014 riots placed 
police into a position of defending aggressive tactics.439  
E. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the analysis, it is possible to determine a number of recommendations to 
assist police with preparations for a possible student riot following a sporting event. The 
recommendations follow the same decision tree established in Chapter III but will 
highlight optimal points for police the influence group behavior within the crowd. Figure 
15 is the decision tree first introduced in earlier in this chapter.  
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Figure 15.  Sport Riot Decision Tree with Recommendations 
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Based on the evidence in combination with the social identify theory, the easiest 
points to influence the crowd is during the milling and circularing phases, where the 
crowd is searching for a purpose. The following are recommendations to police for 
achieving this positive influence. 
1. Influence the Norm through Positive Messaging 
The five-school comparison in Chapter IV revealed an absence of any patterns of 
student riots. While the comparison was clearly too small in numbers of schools 
examined, it did note that the University of Florida has never experienced any type of 
riot, even though Florida has a deep history of championship victories in several sports. 
Florida credits this success to positive messaging about celebrating responsibly.444 The 
University of Arizona used similar messaging 2015, which proved effective. Although 
the examples are limited, positive messaging could contrast social norming impact of 
other events where riots occur. Partnerships between police, schools, and business owners 
could continue this effort throughout the year at other less-important sporting events so 
the norm is anchored in time for the championships.  
2. Maintain Constant Contact with the Group  
Recognizing of the different stages leading up to a sports riot may act as a 
predictor of a violent clash, but preventing it requires influencing the group as it forms. In 
addition to influencing the norm, police officers may be able to influence the group itself. 
The strategy used at the University of Arizona in 2015 placed police officers in constant 
contact with the group once it centralized in the street. In previous years, these officers 
moved to the edges to monitor the activity; however, as the honor challenges occurred, 
the officers either could not see it or were not in a position to take any action. 
Maintaining constant contact with the students reduce anonymity and prevents students 
from becoming empowered by the size and energy of the group. Additionally, by 
maintaining interaction with the students, officers will prevent the smaller groups from 
merging into a large, cohesive group.  
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3. Interact with People Milling Rather than Directing Them 
The initial rush of students into the street (centralizing) is difficult for police to 
prevent. The analysis shows that the epicenter of his activity tends to be a smaller group, 
with larger subgroups milling around this group. During this period, students who are 
milling are looking for positive distinction within the group, which is gained through 
honor challenges. The 2014 BOI video showed that people milling round the main group, 
especially those in casual contact with police, tended to comply to police directions more 
than people that the police were surrounding.445 If the police officers provide people who 
are milling with their own positive distinction their group, they will be less likely to 
develop an identity with the group centralized in the street. Elton Reeves posits that 
group cohesion decreases when there is no threat. In other words, “the well man never 
thinks of his health.”446  
4. Prevent Prolonged Circularing  
Evidence in the cases studies support the theory that honor challenges do not only 
attract the attention of the police, they also build cohesion within the group and could 
potentially provide positive distinction for people that have not yet identified with the 
group. The simple activity of lighting a firework, climbing a pole, or lighting a small fire 
draws the attention and cheers of group members and spectators and creates the 
circularing of the group. This circularing disrupts milling by giving the group a common 
focal point. Quickly responding to this challenge will reduce the circularing effect and 
return people to a state of milling; however, the response must be reasonable, or the 
response itself will reinforce the grouping behavior.  
5. Manage Individuals within the Crowd, Rather than the Crowd 
The key to managing people within a crowd is to address the individual about 
individual behaviors, rather than the crowd for individual behaviors. Hoggett and Scott 
wrote, “When the police hold a view of the crowd as inherently irrational and dangerous 
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they rely upon tactics of mass containment and dispersal.”447 The classical view of 
policing crowds sees the crowd itself as hostile,448 causing a mass police response to 
individual behaviors seen within the crowd. This lack of crowd understanding was 
evident in 1997, when the Tucson Police Department borrowed Miami-Dade Police 
Department’s civil disobedience crowd control model to prepare for future sporting 
events,449 two completely different crowd ideologies. Managing the individuals who are 
challenging the police will reduce the potential of the crowd developing a social identity.  
6. Evaluate All Events, Even If They End Peacefully  
Analyzing data from these case studies proved challenging due to the way police 
departments document events in boards of inquiry and after action reports. In an effort to 
avoid making similar mistakes, police departments tend to focus on tactical mistakes 
rather than effective strategies. In the case of crowd control, there are cases examining 
what went poorly but very little documenting successes. This lack of data makes it 
difficult to compare cases with good outcome to those with bad outcomes in order to 
establish best strategies.  
7. Compare Apples to Apples When Training and Planning for a Sports 
Riot  
Departments should examine the types of disturbances experienced in their 
community before determining the best course of action. The 1997 after action report 
recommended that the Tucson Police Department begin a nationwide search for a 
strategic model to suppress civil unrest. At the time, the Miami-Dade Police Department 
was the national leader for managing large crowds, given its extensive experience with 
protests and civil unrest.450 Sports riots are significantly different in composition 
although they may appear similar on the surface. Sending commanders to different police 
departments during the 2014 Final Four gave Tucson police commanders a better 
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understanding of how each department manages their student, although the strategies 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The evolution of managing riots has had a tumultuous history of conflict between 
protestors and the police. From military tactics in ancient Greece, to the use of water 
cannons in Alabama during the 1960 Civil Rights protests, to the more recent Ferguson 
demonstrations, police continue the quest to maintain order within the expectations of the 
community. Today’s college sport riot maintains the same feel as a political 
demonstration, resulting in a similar police response; however, sporting events lack the 
ideology that demonstrations bring that bonds the participants together. Furthermore, 
commonly cited causes of sports riots, such as the notion that alcohol is the main 
contributor, lacks consistency from event to event. There are many consistent behavioral 
traits seen within the crowd that seems to escalate the energy of a sports celebrations 
where riots occur, such as fireworks, climbing, small fires, fights, and projectiles thrown 
at police. At the same time, police departments use blanket strategies when dealing with 
crowds, much of which is built upon previous experiences or false assumption. For 
example, while scholarly theories may appropriately conclude that sports riots include 
intoxicated males in their young 20s, intoxication alone does not lead to a riot, which 
makes this more of a common characteristic than a causal factor of a sports riot. 
Additionally, although police have adopted the negotiated management style of working 
with crowds rather than against them,452 this practice is more effective with a group that 
has centralized leadership. Sports riots are quite different from other types of 
demonstrations and as such need tailored strategies. These reasons sparked the need for a 
more comprehensive look at the behavior that leads up to a sports riot.  
The five events at the University of Arizona presented very similar crowd 
characterizes that provided the conditions needed for the fans to join together in 
celebration; the location of the celebration was always in a bar district near student 
housing; the games were always later in the tournament; the students always centralized 
in the street following the game; and the police were always present. However, the result 
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following the game was not always a riot, leading to the conclusion that one or more 
subtle characteristics may play a large part in preventing a riot.  
Using the social normalization and the social identity theory (SIT) as models 
provides a different foundation that focuses less on behaviors within the crowd and more 
on crowds unite in to a collective group. Normalization occurs constantly throughout the 
year in the form of subtle messages that creates (when none exists) and changes 
acceptable social behaviors. In the case of sporting events, acceptable behavior is created 
through images of previous behavior provided by the media, social media, and other 
students across the country. Without a mechanism that helps define acceptable behavior, 
such as public information campaign, the student population will define its own. 
Normalization occurs prior to the game and throughout the conclusion, as seen in the 
form of individual behaviors, such wearing common clothing, behavior at the bars while 
watching the game, and centralizing in the street following the game—setting the 
boundaries of behavior in social situations.  
A shared social identity begins prior to the games as students and other fans 
positively interact in support of their team. They develop an informal membership 
through the wearing of team colors, cheering, high-fiving, and other gestures that 
increase cohesion within the crowd under the common ideology of team support. The 
importance and intensity of the game are conditions necessary to elevate the crowd 
excitement, while centralization following the game creates the necessary proximity for 
the crowd to finish the development into a collective group. Now that the group exists, 
members search for positive distinction (milling), which may come at the expense of 
another group (police). Through a series of small challenges, such as centralizing in the 
street or chanting negatively about the opposing sporting team, the in-group (students) 
build cohesion even further. The police see this escalation as a threat and respond by 
opting to clear the road. This final act creates an in-group/out-group conflict that 
ultimately results in escalation of honor challenges, which are now focused at the police. 
From this point, a full riot is inevitable.   
This thesis offers a different explanation about why students act contrary to 
normal behavior during and following a sporting event. Results of the cases studies 
 109 
support that fan grouping patterns are similar from year to year, even though there was an 
eighteen-year separation between the first and last event. These similar patterns, when 
examined through the SIT, gives predictability to the formation of a group, and thus 
offers police commanders preventative strategies for managing crowds rather than only 
relying on mitigating strategies, which ultimately result in conflict. It is noted that due to 
a lack data, further and specific studies are needed to provide more conclusive evidence 
to eliminate other conditions that may add to crowd dynamics. These studies include the 
impact of weather, including temperature and the time of day of the event. In addition, 
police departments must play a larger role in sports riot prevention by capturing related 
data during successful and unsuccessful events.  
While the lessons learned from the University of Arizona sport riots between 
1997 and 2015 provide significant detail about the progression of police strategy and 
tactics, the documentation lacks the detail necessary for police commanders to predict 
future conflict, leaving them to prepare for riots rather than building strategy for 
prevention. By following the recommendations introduced in the previous chapter, law 
enforcement will have the necessary tools to influence groups of students in order to stop 
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